TRNC Public Information Office

TRNC Presidency Under-Secretary Ergun Olgun’s letter to the editor, entitled “The Other Side of the Cyprus Coin” was published in “European Voice”, a weekly in Europe, in its 13-19^th January edition. Ergun Olgun’s letter is as follows:

THE OTHER SIDE OF THE CYPRUS COIN: IS IT NOT TIME TO RE-CONSIDER AND PREPARE FOR SELF-SUSTAINING SETTLEMENT AND STABILITY

There are pressures on Turkey that it must recognize “Cyprus”, an EU member, before it can start accession talks.

No doubt, the Cyprus question needs to be resolved as early as possible for peace and stability on the island and the region. This is also necessary for the enhanced role of the EU in the Eastern Mediterranean after the latest wave of enlargement, and for the smooth membership process of Turkey. But the Cyprus issue is complex, and at the same time paradoxical, and cannot be sustainably resolved through “quick-fix” measures and strategies. A shift in focus beyond the immediate to the longer-term and a reorientation from obsession with the surface symptoms to a better understanding of their underlying causes is therefore vital for self-sustaining settlement and stability.

The objective of this paper is to highlight some of the important, yet little spoken, underlying factors that Turkey has to take into account when addressing its interlinked obligations towards the EU and towards Cyprus.

- The 1959 Zurich and London Agreements provided for bi-national independence for Cyprus resting on the political equality and administrative partnership of the two communities, who were given full autonomy in what were strictly defined as communal affairs. These guidelines were enshrined in the 1960 Constitution which, in effect, established a federal-type internationally guaranteed system of government that was approved by both communities. Turkey, Greece and Britain guaranteed this “state of affairs” under the Treaties of Guarantee and of Alliance.

- On 4 March 1964, following the Greek Cypriot instigated inter-communal violence[1], the Security Council adopted resolution 186 (1964) which, in paragraph 4, recommended the creation, “with the consent of the Government of Cyprus”, of a United Nations peacekeeping force in Cyprus. Since the adoption of this resolution, the Greek Cypriot wing of the partnership government has been portraying itself as the sole owner of the title of “Government of Cyprus”. The Turkish Cypriot partner, together with two of the three Guarantors (Turkey and the UK) immediately stressed the equal political and constitutive powers of the two sides in Cyprus. In an “Aide Memoire” dated 4 March 1964, on the same day as the Security Council issued resolution 186, the UK Mission to the United Nations stressed, for example, that “H.M.G.’s view is that until such time as the Constitution of Cyprus and the Agreements are amended through negotiation and with the consent of all the parties, the Government of the Republic of Cyprus, the Guarantor Powers and the United Nations as a whole have no alternative but to conduct their activities in accordance with the Constitution and with the Agreements.”

- On 30 July 1974, the Foreign Ministers of the three Guarantor powers issued the Geneva Declaration and agreed that there should be re-establishment of constitutional government in Cyprus (a confirmation that the situation obtaining since 1963 had not been constitutional) and noted “the existence in practice in the Republic of Cyprus of two autonomous administrations, that of the Greek Cypriot community and that of the Turkish Cypriot community”.

- On 12 March 1975, the Security Council adopted resolution 367, which, inter alia, entrusted the Secretary General with a new mission of good offices and described the process as: “Negotiations between the representatives of the two communities on an equal footing, the objective of which must continue to be to reach freely a solution providing for a political settlement and the establishment of a mutually acceptable constitutional arrangement…”

- On 11 October 1991, the Security Council adopted resolution 716 in which it reaffirmed its position that the solution to the Cyprus problem needs to be based on one state of Cyprus comprising two politically equal communities and the need for the establishment of a new constitutional arrangement for Cyprus that will ensure the well-being and security of the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities in a bi-communal and bi-zonal federation.

- On 31 March 2004, the UN proposed a comprehensive settlement plan for Cyprus which foresaw the establishment of a new bi-zonal partnership (Main Articles iv) based on the acknowledgement of each side of the other’s distinct identity and integrity and the fact that their relationship is not one of majority and minority but of political equality where neither side may claim authority or jurisdiction over the other (Main Articles iii). In putting together the UN Plan, Secretary-General Kofi Annan confirmed that the settlement needed to provide elements of continuity for both sides in the new state of affairs, and also that the settlement needed to be the source of legitimacy for all matters in the future.

- On 24 April 2004, Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots, exercising their inherent constitutive powers, voted in separate simultaneous referenda on the UN comprehensive settlement plan, which was strongly supported by the EU. The Turkish Cypriot people endorsed the Plan by a 64 percent majority, while the Greek Cypriot people rejected it by a majority of 75 percent.

The fact that Greek “Cyprus” became a member of the EU on 1 May 2004, before a settlement, does not change the unequivocal acceptance by the UN of the political equality of the Turkish Cypriots, as described above. This international recognition of the legitimacy of the Turkish Cypriot position cannot be changed by the pressure put on Turkey to recognize the Greek Cypriot-usurped Government of Cyprus as the sole legitimate authority or representative of the whole island. Among the expected results of such pressure could be counted the further undermining of the UN Secretary General’s mission of good offices, together with the parameters that have emerged over 30 years of UN involvement; the further deepening of the confidence gap between the parties; the further distancing of the two peoples of the island; and further loss of Turkish Cypriot and Turkish confidence in the EU.

Most important, however, the point has to be made that Turkey has already recognized the Republic of Cyprus, namely the 1960 partnership Republic of Cyprus and guaranteed, under the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee, the state of affairs established by the Basic Articles of its Constitution. As such, in addition to its obligations under paragraph 19 of the Presidency Conclusions of the Brussels European Council of 16-17 December 2004, Turkey is legally, politically and morally obligated to address issues and questions like the following when formulating its relations with EU member Greek “Cyprus” and extending the Ankara Agreement to what is conveniently and cumulatively called “Cyprus”:

· There are irregularities and illegitimacies regarding the origin of the Greek Cypriot government as regards the Cyprus Constitution agreed between the parties. As such, Turkey has strong reservations as to the morality or legality of the actions of the Greek Cypriot government. Legal rights cannot derive from an illegal situation (ex injuria jus non oritur).

Interestingly enough, Turkey alone is doing its best with good-will to fulfill its obligations as an EU candidate, while, at the same time, trying to accommodate the paradoxical realities of the island in order to help prepare the ground for a sustainable win-win settlement.

Looked at from a different angle, if what is now required from Turkey is the recognition of the Greek Cypriot government that has emerged since 1963, this in effect amounts to an admittance that the post - 1963 Greek Cypriot-dominated government is in fact unconstitutional and that Turkey’s seal of approval is now being requested in order to give legal authority and legitimacy to that clearly unconstitutional government – forgetting, of course, that without the freely expressed democratic consent of the Turkish Cypriot people that government will remain unconstitutional.

To conclude, it is now admitted by many serious observers of the Cyprus problem that the admission of a divided Cyprus to the EU, in response to a Greek threat to block the Eastern Enlargement, and in total disregard of legality and legitimacy, was a very great mistake. Since two “wrongs” will not make a “right”, the pressure on Turkey to do the impossible and to recognize the Greek Cypriot Government of Cyprus as the sole legitimate authority/representative of the whole island is absurd. The EU, which presents itself as the cradle of tolerance, compromise, multi-culturalism, equal treatment, democracy, rule of law and human rights, has to apply the same criteria to both “owners” of “Cyprus”. EU member countries have to help Turkey to fulfill its obligation under paragraph 19 of the Presidency Conclusions of the Brussels European Council while addressing the other reality of Cyprus and preparing the ground for a fair win-win settlement through the facilitation of the UN. EU member countries can start by ending the inhuman isolation imposed on the Turkish Cypriot people by facilitating direct flights to Ercan Airport and direct trade with North Cyprus as promised.

In the deep-rooted, identity-related conflict of Cyprus, EU member countries should not destroy the chances of a new bi-zonal partnership settlement by further empowering the Greek Cypriot side. Cyprus happens to be the only failed partnership where the option of establishing a new equality-based partnership is still a possibility.

[1] See the 1987 Cyprus Report of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the British House of Commons.

[2] For further details please refer to the UN Secretary General’s report of 10 September 1964 (S/5950) paragraphs 218 and 219 and to his report of 29 July 1965 (S/6569) paragraph 7.

[3] See the memoirs of Mr. Glafkos Clerides, former Greek Cypriot President, in My Deposition, Vol.3, pp.236-237.