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Negotiations
between
1997-2002
TROUTBECK AND GLION TALKS
TURKISH STANCE
GREEK CYPRIOTS INTRANSIGENCE
EU LUXEMBOURG SUMMIT
TURKISH CYPRIOTS CONFEDERATION PROPOSAL
PROXIMITY TALKS
TALKS ENDED
FACE TO FACE TALKS 2002
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS BETWEEN 2003 –
2004
DEVELOPMENTS AFTER THE REFERENDUM
Political Developments
2005-2007
Developments in 2008
In the week of 17 March 1997,
the Deputy Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General for Cyprus,
Gustave Feissel, commenced a new series of proximity talks in line with the
intensified efforts of the UN Secretary-General to facilitate the resumption
of face-to-face negotiations between the leaders of the two communities. The
Turkish Cypriot side, which has repeatedly been expressing its readiness to
engage in meaningful direct negotiations, welcomed this development and
displayed its usual constructive approach during the course of the UN
sponsored proximity talks.
The UN Secretary-General wrote
to the leaders of the two communities on 9 June inviting them to the first
session of face-to-face negotiations to take place in the New York from 9 to
13 July 1997. As both leaders received the formal invitations delivered to
them by the Deputy Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General for
Cyprus, Gustave Feissel, the preparations for the New York summit set off
with full force.
TROUTBECK AND
GLION TALKS
At the end of
the month-long run-up period, the first round of the 1997 Cyprus talks
commenced at Troutbeck, New York. In his opening statement, the UN
Secretary-General stressed that there was a sense of greater urgency, more
of a consensus, than ever that the Cyprus dispute must be brought to an end.
The Secretary-General added that the consequences of failure were likely to
be more dire than at any time in recent decades. The direct talks between
the leaders of the two communities in Cyprus were led by the Special Advisor
of the UN Secretary-General on Cyprus, Diego Cordovez in complete media
blackout. However, the existence of a document
"outlining a solution to the
Cyprus problem"
and its entire contents were leaked to the media by the Greek
Cypriot side. It was revealed at the end of the talks, which concluded a day
earlier than expected, that the UN had actually presented two "non-papers"
to the sides, requesting them to work on the revised version in preparation
for the next round of direct talks expected to take place in Switzerland the
following month.
After briefing the UN Security
Council on the course of the face-to-face negotiations on 14 July, Mr.
Cordovez told reporters that the gap between the two sides was still
"enormous" but he believed commitment existed to move forward. The
comments of the US Presidential Envoy, Richard Holbrooke, who had separate
meetings with the two leaders both before and after the Troutbeck talks,
echoed those of Mr. Cordovez. Mr. Holbrooke stated that he was optimistic
about future progress despite the existence of a wide gap between the
positions of the two sides.
In a statement issued in New
York on July 14, President Denktaþ expressed his gratitude to the new UN
Secretary-General for convening the direct talks which he described as a
positive first step in a new settlement process. President Denktaþ added
that this was an opportune time for the UN and the world community to act
given the imminent threat next year of the deployment of Russian S-300
missiles by the Greek Cypriot side.
The promising atmosphere
created by the first direct negotiations between the leaders of the two
communities since October 1992 was frustrated by the European Union only
three days after their conclusion. On 16 July, the European Commission
submitted to the European Parliament a document entitled "Agenda 2000"
which, among other things, included "Cyprus" among the six countries to
start accession negotiations with the European Union early next year. This
decision of the European Commission, taken in complete disregard of the rule
law, the international Treaties governing Cyprus and the well known position
of the Turkish Cypriot side on EU accession, can only help eliminate the
chances of success in the ongoing negotiations by encouraging the Greek
Cypriot side to become ever more intransigent.
In fact, the Greek Cypriot
leader, Mr. Clerides had made it clear long before the Troutbeck
negotiations commenced that the Greek Cypriot side would be attending the
direct negotiations only to ensure the European Union membership of the
Greek Cypriot administration. On 3 June 1997, Mr. Clerides was reported by
the Greek Cypriot press to have said that the Greek Cypriot decision to
attend direct talks was "a purely cosmetic move in order not to appear
the negative side and so harm the Republic's prospects of accession to the
European Union." It is amply clear that the Greek Cypriot
side will have no incentives to be constructive given the recent decision of
the European Commission.
The actual reason behind Greek
Cypriot’s attendance to the talks both in Troutbeck and Glion (Montreux) was
evident in Mr. Clerides’s words, which he uttered at a press conference in
November 1997, when he was referring to the talks:
“The trick here is to give the
impression that you are going to accept a proposal in order to get the other
side to reject it and then portray the other side as the intransigent party
to the world”.
TURKISH STANCE
Emphasizing the
blow dealt on process of negotiations by EU decision on the commencement of
the membership negotiations with the Greek Cypriot side, Turkey and the
Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) issued a joint statement on 20
July 1997 which expressed their will and determination to further deepen and
strengthen the existing cooperation established between the two countries
within the framework of the 20 January 1997 Joint Declaration made by their
Presidents. The statement which listed nine economic, financial, security,
defence and foreign policy measures to be implemented, declared that
".....every structural cooperation and harmonization
measure to be initiated between the Greek Cypriot administration of
Southern Cyprus and the EU will be similarly implemented between the TRNC
and Turkey."
In spite of the negative
atmosphere created by the "Agenda 2000" report of the European Commission
and its strong disappointment at the one-sided approach of the European
Union, the Turkish Cypriot side once again displayed its usual
constructiveness and announced on 4 August 1997 that it would be attending
the second round of the direct talks scheduled to start in Glion,
Switzerland on 11 August 1997.
On 6 August 1997, an Agreement
to establish an Association Council between Turkey and the Turkish Republic
of Northern Cyprus, in line with the Joint Statement dated 20 July 1997, was
signed by the Foreign Ministers of the two countries during the working
visit the Turkish Foreign Minister paid to the island.
In a joint press statement
issued after the signing of the Association Council Agreement, the two
parties underlined once again that the negotiating process should be based
on the political and sovereign equality of the two sides in Cyprus and that
the settlement should safeguard the balance between Turkey and Greece
stipulated by the 1960 Agreements. It was also noted that the EU, which
should acknowledge the political realities of the island and the region,
would bear the responsibility for any negative developments arising from the
commencement of the accession negotiations between the Greek Cypriot
administration and the European Union.
It needs to be stressed that
the Association Council Agreement was nothing beyond a legitimate self-defence
mechanism established in the face of the Greek Cypriot attempt to impose its
will on the Turkish Cypriot side through EU membership, which was
unfortunately being encouraged by the words and deeds of the European Union
itself. It is in this spirit that the Turkish Cypriot side attended the
second round of the direct talks held at Glion which it saw as an
opportunity to make a global review of the Cyprus question and to find out
whether there was a chance for the two sides to meet on cardinal points in
order to achieve a settlement.
GREEK CYPRIOTS
INTRANSIGENCE
However, the talks at Troutbeck
and Glion did not produce the desired results because Mr. Clerides refused
to budge an inch from his entrenched fundamental position of trying to
reduce the Turkish Cypriot people to a "protected minority" in a "Greek
Cyprus", while the EU Commission's report entitled "Agenda 2000" envisaging
the commencement of accession negotiations with "Cyprus" in early 1998
dashed hopes for any progress towards a comprehensive settlement. This
illtimed development, which occurred totally outside the will of the Turkish
Cypriot side and in spite of its justified objections to EU membership prior
to a settlement and the maintenance of the Greco-Turkish balance in the
Eastern Mediterranean, dealt a devastating blow to the course of the
negotiations.
EU LUXEMBOURG
SUMMIT
The intervention of the
European Union which was instigated by Greece and the Greek Cypriot side,
reached a climax at the Luxembourg Summit, held on 13 December 1997. The
Luxembourg European Council took the decision to start the accession
negotiations with “Cyprus”. Moreover, it request “the willingness of the
Government of Cyprus to include the representatives of the Turkish Cypriot
community in the negotiation delegation to be acted upon”. Acceptance by the
Turkish Cypriot side to take part in the so-called Cyprus delegation would
have meant, recognition of the Greek Cypriot side as the “government of
Cyprus” and abandonment of their equal political status and sovereignty
rights enshrined in the 1960 Treaties.
The Luxembourg decision put the
final blow to the intercommunal talks in 1997, by destroying the parameters
established through the good offices mission of the UN Secretary-General for
a solution and the very basis of the intercommunal talks – namely the
equality of the two sides and bi-zonality – which have been continuing on
and off for many years, with no outcome due to the recognition of the Greek
Cypriot side as the “government” of the whole of Cyprus.
Following the unfortunate
Luxembourg decision of the EU, the Legislative Assembly of the TRNC passed a
resolution, on 10 March 1998, which states that “Turkish Republic of
Northern Cyprus is an undeniable fact… Denying this reality… does not serve
the efforts for a peaceful solution on the island… It is, therefore,
imperative that any future of the existence of two states in Cyprus and the
grave mistake of treating the Greek Cypriot administration as the
‘government of the Turkish Cypriot people be put an end to’.” Thus, it was
decided that, from then on, the negotiations between the two sides can only
take place between the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus and the Greek
Cypriot State in Southern Cyprus.
The Joint Declaration of 23
April 1998 between the Turkish President and the President of the TRNC
reinforced this resolution by reiterating that the EU decision to open the
accession negotiations with the Greek Cypriot side “…dealt a blow to the
efforts for a solution… Thus, it was noted the continuation of the existence
of the TRNC as an independent and sovereign state is fundamental”. For the
Turkish Cypriot side there existed no ground to proceed with the
negotiations.
TURKISH CYPRIOTS
CONFEDERATION PROPOSAL
On 31 August 1998, the Turkish
Cypriot side put forward proposals which provides a realistic and valid
foundation for a lasting solution on the island, on the basis of confederal
partnership, by protecting the vital and legitimate rights and interests of
all the parties concerned. The Turkish Cypriot proposal of 31 August was
consistent with the spirit and the underlying philosophy of the relevant UN
Security Council resolutions in that
·
It calls for a just and lasting
settlement
·
It provides for a freely
negotiated and mutually acceptable solution
·
It is based on the equality of
the two sides
·
It facilitates the UN
Secretary-General’s mission of good offices. Unfortunately the Greek Cypriot
side, encouraged by the prospect of EU membership, immediately rejected the
Turkish Cypriot proposal.
The confederation proposal, in
essence, updated the 1960 State of affairs pertaining to Cyprus by
preserving the internal balance in and external balance over Cyprus. These
are the main elements for peace in the island and in the Eastern
Mediterranean. The proposal reflected the realism and the vision in that it
represented a common future based on full equality, symmetry and unity.
However, the Greek Cypriot side in a traditional manner rejected the
confederation proposal, as well.
Whilst, in one hand the Turkish
Cypriot side was coming forward with proposals in line with its tradition of
courage, responsibility and creativity on the way for a viable settlement,
the Greek Cypriot side was in an effort of building up armaments and
ordering Russian made S-300 missiles.
The Greek Cypriot side, in the
meantime, was dealing with its massive militarization campaign carried out
under the pretext of strategic cooperation (“Joint Defence Doctrine”) with
Greece, coupled with the deployment of S-300 missiles and the opening of a
military airbase for Greece in South Cyprus. This was another adventurous
policy of the Greek-Greek Cypriot front which was abolished later as a
result of the determined stand against it by Turkey and the TRNC.
Efforts of the UN Secretary
General Kofi Annan, to restart negotiations between the TRNC and the Greek
Cypriot administration after two years of stagnation, gave fruit when the
two leaders accepted to meet late in 1999.
The talks would be held between
the two equal parties without any preconditions, the parties being free to
bring to the table any issue which they deemed as a “core issue”.
PROXIMITY TALKS
On the first round of proximity
talks, TRNC President Rauf R. Denktaþ and the Greek Cypriot Leader Glafcos
Clerides met in New York, between 3-14 December 1999.
Then, this was followed by the
second round of proximity talks in Geneva, between 31 January – 8 February
2000. The Turkish Cypriot party joined the talks with profound
disappointment over an incident which occurred in Southern Cyprus on the eve
of the second round.
On 11 January 2000, a Turkish
Cypriot television crew from BRT crossed to the South to cover a joint news
conference that was to be held by the visiting Greek Foreign Minister, Mr.
George Papandreu, and his Greek Cypriot host, Mr. Yiannakis Cassulides.
Papandreuou’s visit was stated to be aimed at promoting better relations
between Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots, as an extension of the positive
climate between Greece and Turkey in recent months, emerged amid the
earthquake disasters in both countries.
At the said joint press
conference, the Greek Cypriot Press and Information Office (PIO) officials,
tried to conceal the microphone with BRT logo behind a bunch of flowers when
the BRT officials asked to remove it, did not. The banning made the BRT crew
and other Turkish Cypriot journalists walk out in protest. This showed the
utter intolerance of the Greek Cypriot side of any indication, sign or
symbol of Turkish Cypriot existence, and the tough road that lied ahead in
achieving reconciliation.
Despite little evidence of
progress by the end of the talks on February 8, the leaders agreed to attend
a third round of proximity talks on 23 May. However, Clerides’ ill-health
following an operation forced the third round to be postponed to July 5 in
Geneva, which lasted on 13 July, 2000. The talks were resumed again in
Geneva, on 24 July after the 20 July, Peace and Freedom Day Celebrations in
the TRNC.
UN Special envoy Alvaro de
Soto, put forward some ideas in this meeting and asked for the responses
from the two sides. However, the intransigent attitude possessed by the
Greek Cypriot side, which targetted to acceed the EU, did not intend to
settle for an agreement. The efforts of the UN did not give fruit and De
Soto wrapped up the talks on 4 August to fix the next round for September
12, in New York. Alvaro De Soto, seeing the difficulty in bringing the sides
to a common ground noted that, he doubted a solution could be found by the
end of the year.
On his return to the island a
day later, Clerides said the Greek Cypriot side would not be prepared to
continue the negotiations indefinitely if there were no signs of progress.
The Greek Cypriot stance became even further offencive, after the
Secretary-General’s statement on the opening of the forth round of proximity
talks in New York on 12 September, 2000.
Secretary General H.E. Kofi
Annan spoke of a “new partnership”, “the equal status of the two parties”
and the fact that “each represents its side – and no one else”. H.E.
Kofi Annan put forward his desire as “-as the political equal of the other,
a comprehensive settlement enshrining a new partnership..” However, the
Greek Cypriot side’s reaction to this statement, its boycotting of the talks
for two days and the UN’s efforts to appease the Greek Cypriot party dashed
hopes for carrying that statement to its logical conclusion, which should
have been the acknowledgement of the realities in Cyprus, i.e. the existence
of two sovereign, independent States on the island. The Secretary General’s
statement was rejected also by the Greek Cypriot government, in Southern
Cyprus.
In the subsequent phases of the
proximity talks, the UN, with the non-papers it presented, adopted an
approach which fundamentally reflected the position of the Greek Cypriot
party and ignored the legitimate demands and concerns of the Turkish Cypriot
party.
The two leaders met in Geneva
between 1-10 November 2000, during which the Secretary General presented his
11-page “Oral Remarks” composed of 20 points, on 8 November 2000. In the
Turkish Cypriot view, the “Oral Remarks” of the Secretary-General
fundamentally departed from the concept of “a new partnership” and “the
equal status of the two parties” as well as from the very objective of
finding a just, realistic and viable settlement. In his “Oral Remarks”, the
Secretary-General envisaged that there should be “one sovereign,
indissoluble common state” with a “single international legal personality”
and a “common government” with a “basic law”. These were the characteristics
of a “unitary State” that did not conform to the idea of a new partnership
which was not acceptable for the Turkish Cypriot party. The Turkish Cypriot
viewpoint was and still today is that the two existing sovereign States
would establish a partnership structure, and the respective States would
exercise all competences and functions not assigned by them to the
partnership structure. The “Oral Remarks” had many other deficienties like,
the term “community” was used for the two peoples, in reference to the EU
membership it was stated that the “provision of the comprehensive settlement
should not represent an obstacle to such membership”, and issues like
“territorial adjustments”, and guarantees were not satisfying. The Turkish
Cypriot party realizing that the “Oral Remarks” had been tailored to meet
the demands of the Greek Cypriot party, in disregard of even the most vital
needs and interests of the Turkish Cypriot people, concluded that the
process had turned into a vehicle by which legitimate rights, existence and
identity would be sacrificed in a predominantly “Greek Cyprus”, within the
European Union.
Moreover, in an interesting
“coincidence”, on 8 November 2000, the EU issued it is Accession
Partnership document making the Cyprus issue a political criterion and a
precondition for Turkey’s own EU membership.
TALKS ENDED
As a result of the above
incidents, President Rauf R. Denktaþ announced on 24 November, 2000 that the
Turkish Cypriot side would not continue the talks unless the original
parameters of “State-to-State talks” are accepted through the
acknowledgement of the TRNC, and recognition of the reality that the Greek
Cypriots are not the government of the Turkish Cypriots or the whole of
Cyprus, and do not represent the Turkish Cypriots or the whole of the
island.
Following the Summit Meeting
held in Ankara on 24 November, between the delegation of the TRNC and
Turkey, headed respectively by President Rauf R. Denktaþ and President Ahmet
Necdet Sezer, President Denktaþ announced that the proximity talks had
deviated from their declared objective and continuing the proximity talks
without Turkish Cypriot parameters having being accepted was harming Turkish
Cypriot interests. He added that the Turkish Cypriot party would only sit at
the table, once the Turkish Cypriot parameters had been accepted. In a
subsequent statement, Turkey expressed its full support for the TRNC
decision.
With this decision, the
proximity talks which had started with the UN Secretary-General’s statement
of 14 November 1999, aimed at preparing the ground for meaningful
negotiations leading to a comprehensive settlement, after five intermittent
rounds starting in New York on 3 December 1999 and ending in Geneva on 10
November 2000, came to a halt.
After about six months,
Secretary-General Kofi Annan met President Rauf Denktaþ in Salzburg, Austria
on 28 August 2001, as part of efforts for the resumption of talks on Cyprus.
H.E. Kofi Annan announced that they held a “very good and very useful
meeting”. He asked his Special Adviser on Cyprus, Alvaro de Soto, to travel
to the island for consultations with both President Denktaþ and Greek
Cypriot Leader Glafcos Clerides.
De Soto made his contacts
between 30 August – 5 September 2001 with the two sides after which he made
an announcement on 4 September 2001, that he invited the two leaders to
initiate a new reinvigorated phase of the Secretary General’s good offices
in the following week, in New York. Whilst, Greek Cypriot Leader Glafcos
Clerides accepted the meeting, President Rauf Denktaþ announced that he is
not able to go to New York, adding that “it was premature to invite the two
parties to New York for a meeting for resuming the talks”. He pointed out
that, the rejection of H.E. Kofi Annan’s 12 September 2000 statement by the
Greek Cypriot side had left nothing, no common ground whatsoever to engage
in invigorated meaningful talks.
The intransigent and chauvinist
attitude by the Greek Cypriot side during the year 2001, did not give hope
to the Turkish Cypriot people for a new partnership. A few of such attitudes
are given below which were published in the Greek Cypriot press.
-
“Turks, Turks, you will die. You will die in
front of the blue and white flag.”
-
“All Turks must be driven out to sea”.
(Slogans chanted each morning
by soldiers in the Greek Cypriot National Guards published in the Greek
Cypriot daily Haravghi, 22 March 2001)
-
“We could bring the S-300s at any time”
(Glafcos Clerides, English
Language Greek Cypriot daily Cyprus Mail, 3 April 2001)
-
- “…the rearmament of Southern Cyprus continues
within the framework of Greek-Greek Cypriot Joint Military Doctrine”
(Glafcos Clerides, Greek
Cypriot daily Politis, 23 April 2001)
-
“Tonight we are closer than ever to the beloved
territory of Kyrenia”
(AKEL party leader Dimitris
Christofias, 19 May 2001)
The Greek Cypriot party,
encouraged particularly by the European Union’s one-sided and misplaced
approach to the issue, turned its back on the concept of a bi-zonal
settlement. The Greek Cypriot side started talking about a “German-style
federation” in which there could be no limits or regulations on the freedom
of movement, settlement and the right to property. This would make a mockery
of the principle of bi-zonality, which has since evolved into a two-state
situation, and is a clear recipe for a return to the past, and, ultimately,
for disaster. It should be reckoned that Germany was one nation divided
along ideological lines during the Cold War, whereas in Cyprus there has
always been two peoples belonging to two different nations.
However, the acknowledgement of
the usurped title of the ‘Government of Cyprus’ by the Greek Cypriot
administration in the international arena influences their intransigent
stance which blocks the efforts for cooperation between the two sides. The
conditions “to engage in a new and reinvigorated phase of the search for a
comprehensive settlement” were not prevailing.
The Greek Cypriot leader
Glafcos Clerides, accepting the invitation by the UN Secretary-General for a
meeting on 12 September 2001 flew to New York. However, his plane had to be
diverted to Canada due to the terrorist attacks which took place mainly in
New York and Washington. His meeting with the UN Secretary-General had been
cancelled and he had to return to Cyprus on 14 September.
The Turkish Cypriot side in the
meantime confirmed on each occassion that as per his Excellency’s 12
September 2000 statement the Turkish Cypriot party is still prepared to
establish a new partnership with the Greek Cypriots, based on the equal
status of the two parties. It seemed imperative that a fresh and realistic
approach conducive to progress in the negotiations be adopted, in order to
open the way for reconciliation. With this aim, President Rauf Raif Denktaþ
took the initiative and sent letters to the Greek Cypriot leader Glafcos
Clerides on 8 November 2001. This was followed by two more reciprocal
letters between the two leaders, as a result of which Clerides accepted to
meet President Denktaþ on 4 December 2001, in the UN residence in Lefkoþa in
presence of the UN Special envoy on Cyprus, Alvaro de Soto who only took
notes. The historically important meeting which drew the attention of the
whole world, passed in a very sincere and positive atmosphere after which
the following press statement was issued:
“That the Secretary-General, in
the exercise of his mission of good offices, would invite the two leaders to
direct talks;
These talks will be held in
Cyprus starting in mid-January 2002 on UN premises;
That there will be no
preconditions;
That all issues will be on the
table;
That they will continue to
negotiate in good faith until a comprehensive settlement in achieved;
That nothing will be agreed
until everything is agreed”.
After the face-to-face talks,
it was stated that the two leaders had agreed to resume a second round of
direct talks on the Cyprus issue on 15 January 2002, which was later
postponed to 16 January 2002.
FACE
TO FACE TALKS 2002
The following is the full text
of President Denktaþ opening statement which was read out during the
meeting:
“The Cyprus Question is
approaching a critical point. At this juncture, we have the political will
and readiness to start a genuine new process based on the political equality
of the two parties for negotiating the establishment of a new partnership.
We have a major role to play in
reaching a comprehensive settlement and in creating a desired environment of
confidence, cooperation and partnership. I believe the time has come for Mr.
Clerides and myself to move ahead and to take the necessary initiatives so
that future generations do not go through the bitter experiences we have
endured.
A few facts need to be
reiterated at this juncture. The Turkish Cypriot people and the Greek
Cypriot people are the co-owners of Cyprus and this Island is the common
home of both peoples. The independence and the sovereignty of the
Partnership Republic of Cyprus were entrusted in 1960 to these co-founding
partners with equal status upon explicit recognition of their separate
rights to self-determination, while establishing a balanced status between
the two guarantor motherlands and their rights over Cyprus. Today there
exist functioning democratic institutions on both sides, which reflect the
political will of their respective peoples.
In shaping our future the basic
requirement is realism. This realism must be solidified with an atmosphere
of mutual respect, reconciliation and a working relationship between the two
parties.
We took note of the recent
statements by the EU officials that the EU will accommodate itself to the
terms of the political settlement to be agreed by both parties. In this
respect, we will support the membership of the Cyprus Partnership in the EU
within the terms of a political settlement. The balance established between
Turkey and Greece with regard to Cyprus by the 1960 Treaties is also crucial
and has to be maintained in every respect.
I believe that this
face-to-face interaction provides a new and significant opportunity for both
parties in reaching a common understanding on how we can move forward.
Our vision is a peaceful Cyprus
where our two peoples live in harmony and cooperation under a new
partnership structure based on the equal status and sovereign equality of
the two Partner States. The new Partnership will have single international
personality in its areas of competence. We believe this vision is within
reach.
We should focus on what our
common interests are and how we can serve them by mutual efforts. What needs
to be done now is to lay down the objectives and elements of a comprehensive
settlement addressing the legitimate concerns of both parties.
Efforts for a viable settlement
in Cyprus could yield desired results only in an environment of mutual
trust. The way to a Cyprus settlement is through positive relations between
the two parties in the Island. Therefore, if we are to initiate a process
for settlement with the expectation of a successful outcome, the issue of
trust and confidence must also be addressed.
With this understanding, I
propose, the setting up of a Bilateral Committee under our Co-Chairmanship.
Such a Bilateral Committee could take up and discuss:
I) All major issues of the Cyprus Question
II)
The steps to be taken for generating a climate
of mutual respect and confidence.
We should continue to discuss
all aspects of the Cyprus Question. I suggest that we start to take up the
core issues in a detailed manner in our next meeting. As we proceed, we may
seek the support of our respective experts and the UN.
We may not have a common
understanding on all issues but the process of consultation has to continue
so that through dialogue and interaction we may be able to tackle content
and find a way forward.
The ideas I have put forward
constitute a new pattern of relationship. I believe that our objective is to
leave future generations a Cyprus on which the two peoples could live in
prosperity, security and cooperative on the basis of equality”.
On 5 December, 2001 the Greek
Cypriot leader Glafcos Clerides, crossed over to the TRNC, first after the
1974 Peace Operation, in order to attend a dinner being hosted by President
Denktaþ, held at the Presidential Palace. UN Secretary-General’s Special
Adviser to Cyprus, Alvaro de Soto, Presidential Undersecretary, Ergün Olgun
and the former Presidential Adviser on Political Affairs, Necati Münir
Ertekün attended the dinner. No statement was issued after the meeting.
In recurrence to this, the
Greek Cypriot leader Glafcos Clerides invited President Denktaþ for a
dinner, which took place on 29 December 2001 at his private home in Southern
Lefkoþa.
It is announced after the
dinner that, the two leaders agreed to try to resolve the fate of more than
2000 people missing in the years of intercommunal clashes, until the Peace
Operation in 1974.
The
ideas I have put forward constitute a new pattern of relationship. I believe
that our objective is to leave future generations a Cyprus on which the two
peoples could live in prosperity, security and cooperation on the basis of
equality”.
On
5 December, 2001 the Greek Cypriot leader Glafcos Clerides, crossed over to
the TRNC, first after the 1974 Peace Operation, in order to attend a dinner
being hosted by President Denktaþ, held at the Presidential Palace. UN
Secretary-General’s Special Adviser to Cyprus, Alvaro de Soto,
Presidential Undersecretary, Ergün Olgun and the former Presidential
Adviser on Political Affairs, Necati Münir Ertekün attended the dinner. No
statement was issued after the meeting.
In
recurrence to this, the Greek Cypriot leader Glafcos Clerides invited
President Denktaþ for a dinner, which took place on 29 December 2001 at his
private home in Southern Lefkoþa.
It
is announced after the dinner that, the two leaders agreed to try to resolve
the fate of more than 2000 people missing in the years of inter-communal
clashes, until the Peace Operation in 1974.
The
face-to-face talks were announced to start on 16 January 2002 which was
later brought forward to 11 January 2002. In a following meeting on 14
January, the leader of the Greek Cypriot administration, Glafcos Clerides
agreed to exchange documents regarding the issue of missing persons and the
two leaders pointed out that the
issue of missing persons would be held separate from the process of the
face-to-face talks since the possibility of finding a formula on this issue
had increased.
The
two leaders have met for a series of talks in the presence of the UN Special Envoy in Cyprus Alvaro
de Soto who briefly stated that the two leaders are “engaged in discussing
the substance, and that they had agreed to meet for a pattern of meetings on
Monday, Wednesday and Friday evenings,
the meeting being closed to the press”. Alvaro de Soto also said
that the meetings were “an encouraging start and had been very good and
cordial”.
The
two leaders in the following meetings until the end of February worked on
identifying the “ points of disagreements and the functions of the two
sides” in case of establishing a new Republic. Nonetheless, the two sides
showed that they are “cautiously optimistic”, for a lasting settlement.
Until
the end of April, three rounds of face-to-face talks were undertaken as a
result of which the two sides respectively put on the table non-papers,
which included the interests of each side.
Whilst
the forth round of talks were continuing, between 14-16 May 2002 the UN
Secretary General Kofi Annan visited Cyprus. On his arrival Mr. Annan stated
that “he came to the island to highlight the great responsibility the two
leaders had undertaken , to urge them to forge ahead with a shared sense of
urgency and willingness to compromise the earnest”. He added, referring to
the face-to face talks that, “this was an historic opportunity”.
After
meeting with the Greek Cypriot leader Glafcos Clerides on 14 May, on 15 May
2002, H.E. Mr. Kofi Annan crossed over to TRNC and got together with
President Rauf R. Denktaþ, at the Presidential Palace. The TRNC Foreign
Affairs and Defence Minister Tahsin Ertuðruloðlu, the Presidential
Undersecretary Ergün Olgun, The Undersecretary of the Foreign Affairs and
Defence Ministry Reþat Çaðlar and President’s Adviser on Constitution Mümtaz
Soysal were also present at the meeting.
Following
the two hours meeting , President Denktaþ expressed his pleasure on seeing
Annan in the TRNC and said the talks had been useful adding that they
discussed the Cyprus issue in detail. President
Denktaþ pointed out that the Secretary General did not put forward any
proposal.
The
UN Secretary General’s day of intensive diplomacy ended with bringing
together at night, the TRNC President Rauf R. Denktaþ together with the
Greek Cypriot leader Glafcos Clerides, at a working dinner in the UN
residence at the buffer zone. No statements were made after the meeting
other than mutters of satisfaction for the meal and a comment about “good
discussions” from the three main parties.
Before
his departure, the UN Secretary General Kofi Annan held a press conference
evaluating his contacts with the two leaders. The full text of his statement
is as follows:
“Yesterday I called on
H.E. Mr Glafkos Clerides, the Greek Cypriot leader, and H.E. Mr Rauf Denktaþ,
the Turkish Cypriot leader. The three of us met last night and I had the
pleasure of hosting them for dinner.
Altogether, I have had
several hours of discussions on both the substance and the procedure.
I am concluding my visit
sobered by the challenge at hand, but even more deeply convinced that this
is the time to press on and rise to that challenge.
As I said on my arrival
two days ago, an historic opportunity exists now to reach a comprehensive
settlement. There is no doubt in my mind that this would be in the
interest of both sides and the region. This opportunity must be seized.
I have reminded both
leaders of the responsibility they shoulder, and of my willingness to help
them reach the goal they set out to achieve at the end of last year.
The two leaders have
stated to me their readiness to intensify their effort. I come away
from Cyprus with the commitment of both leaders to go about this effort in a
genuine spirit of give and take.
Despite their
differences on substance and on the time frame, I am still convinced -- for
my part -- that between now and the end of June, they can resolve all the
core issues -- provided they go about their task decisively and with the
necessary political will. The core issues I have asked them to focus on are
governance, security, territory and property. Of course the two leaders
agreed last December that all issues are on the table.
I appeal to the two
leaders to rise to the challenge and I am looking to the motherlands --
Greece and Turkey -- for sustained and constructive support.”
On
June 1, 2002 the Turkish Foreign Minister Ýsmail Cem arrived in the TRNC
for a three-day visit. Foreign Minister Cem on his arrival confirmed that
Turkey fully supported any efforts aimed at finding a mutually acceptable
two-state model as a solution.
The
fourth round series of direct talks came to a pause between President
Denktas and the Leader of the Greek Cypriot administration Glafcos Clerides,
on June 2, 2002. The UN Special Envoy to Cyprus Alvaro de Soto used the
break to visit New York and brief the UN Security Council on the situation
which he described as a “conundrum”. Alvaro de Soto said, he was
“disappointed” that the June deadline had passed without any results
adding that there seemed to be lack of political will that negatively
influences both sides.
TRNC
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Defence issued a statement on July 11,
reiterating that the Turkish Cypriot side will continue with the efforts
with goodwill and on the basis of equality, for a lasting and balanced
agreement which will not bring about pre-1974 conditions. The statement
concluded as “if there will be a compromise in Cyprus, it will be a new
partnership established by two separate sovereign States”.
On
July 16, the talks between the two leaders started again, with Alvaro de
Soto in attendance. Reports from the talks said that the two leaders decided
on a working programme for the remaining summer months. The fifth round of
talks begun under the shadow of the Greek Cypriot administration’s
secretly deploying Russian-made attack helicopters. The European Union, on
the other hand, was trying to interfere the negotiation process with its
open support for the Greek Cypriots. Despite these and other setbacks
however, President Denktaþ confirmed that the Turkish Cypriot side would
not withdraw from the negotiating table “because we are defending our
rights.”
On
July 31, the UN announced that both the TRNC President and the Greek Cypriot
Leader Glafcos Clerides accepted an invitation by the UN Secretary General
Kofi Annan to meet in Paris “to take stock and see if a course can be
charted for the way ahead”.
PARIS
SUMMIT
The
meeting took place on September 6, 2002 however, failed to achieve any kind of
breakthrough or even change, in the direct talks.Calling on both sides to exert
themselves in cooperation with Mr. de Soto, Kofi Annan set the date for another
“check-up” meeting in New York on October 3-4, when again progress would be
measured.
President
Denktaþ said on his arrival that the meeting had been timely and he was happy
to have been there. He added that “everything was discussed, everything was
explained”, however, he expressed the negative influence of the EU which views
the Greek Cypriot administration as the only government in the island. Following
the Paris meeting, the two leaders resumed the direct talks soon on Wednesday,
September 12, 2002.
President
Rauf Denktaþ and the Greek Cypriot Leader Glafcos Clerides got prepared in the
meantime and met the UN Secretary General Kofi Annan for more talks in New York
on 3-4 October, 2002. Prior to setting off for the talks, President Denktaþ
said, “the UN Secretary General and we ourselves desire that the ongoing
Cyprus issue of forty years duration will come to end through reconciliation”.
NEW
YORK SUMMIT
Setting
the tone of his stand at the meeting, President Denktaþ reiterated the rights
and the expectations of the Turkish Cypriot people from a possible settlement.
President Denktaþ gave a strong warning to the EU during a press meeting after
the first day of the summit, when he said that if the EU accepts the membership
of the Greek Cypriot administration, negotiations will stop immediately and
division of the island will become permanent.
On
October 5, at the end of the third summit meeting between the two leaders, it
was revealed that both sides had agreed to appoint two committees to work on
technical issues, and to meet again somewhere around mid-November to again
assess progress in line with developments.
It
was noted that, the “technical committees” would focus on the treaties and
laws involved with setting up a “common establishment” on the island. The
first committee would look into agreements that the two sides have with other
states to see whether or not they would fit in with a new constitution designed
for the “common state”. The second committee would examine legislation
required for the functioning of the “common establishment”.
Following
the October 3-4 New York summit meeting, President Denktaþ went straight on
into the New York Colombia Presbyterian Medical Center, where he had heart
surgery.
THE
UN DOCUMENT
On
November 11, 2002 the UN Secretary General Kofi Annan presented to the two sides
his yellow covered 137-page document prepared to find a new settlement in
Cyprus. Both sides were presented with the plan at the same time and told that
they had a week to formulate their ideas and responses. The document was handed
to President Rauf Denktaþ who was still in the hospital, recuperating after his
serious surgery.
The
UN document, also called as the “Cyprus Peace Plan” or the “Annan Plan”
caused fierce debating on either sides and drew public reaction especially on
the Turkish Cypriot side since it involved two maps, both of which had foreseen
vast amounts of land recession in the TRNC.
President
Rauf Denktaþ, who was handed the document in the hospital asked for an
extension of one week deadline, however Kofi Annan replied that he “felt that
one week was sufficient” to come up with some kind of response. This was
changed shortly after and Kofi Annan agreed that an extension was possible in
view of the extenuating circumstances.
The
document was in fact designed not so much as a solution in itself, but more as a
basis for further negotiations leading to a settlement. Whether it would work or
not was also questioned on both sides. Right at the beginning, President Denktaþ
said that he would give the plan a thorough and careful study and added that the
Turkish Cypriot side would maintain a constructive approach. He also noted that
“it is also necessary to take into account the views of the people. There are
maps on the table, and these maps have to do with people’s lands and their
‘very freedoms’ ”.
The
UN document simply foreseen a single state comprised of two “component
states” (later revised as “constituent states”) with their own
constitutions. The single “Cyprus state” would have an international
identity, and have a bicameral parliament made up of a Senate and Chamber of
Deputies and a presidency rotating between the two sides. The document further
envisaged a massive demilitarisation of the island. Nevertheless, both Turkey
and Greece would maintain military forces on the island but with numbers not
going beyond four digits. (see. Documents section for the Plans).
Both
sides expressed the parts they opposed in the plan. The Turkish Cypriot side
declared it would not accept any agreements which would water down the
sovereignty of the TRNC and Turkey’s guarantees, make land recessions which
would cause thousands of Turkish Cypriots to become refugees once more, allow
citizens who came from Turkey and settled in the TRNC to leave, thus let vast
amounts of Greek Cypriots to resettle in the north with rights to vote and be
elected. Apart from others, the
Greek Cypriot Leader Glafcos Clerides announced that the Greek Cypriot side
would not share equal sovereignty rights with the Turkish Cypriots.
FIRST
REVISION
As
a result of the criticisms, the UN Secretary General Kofi Annan
revised his document which involved slight changes in the framework
was released on December 10, 2002. It was only two days before December
12-13 Copenhagen Summit and it caused uproar in the island.
The
European Union approved during the summit the Greek Cypriot
administration’s unilateral EU membership, in total disregard of the
historical, legal and political realities in Cyprus. The EU’s another
misguided decision, was taken ostensibly on behalf of Cyprus as a whole, in
violation of the principle of the rule of law and in disregard of the
existence of two equal sovereign peoples in Cyprus. The unilateral EU
membership of Southern Cyprus was the violation of the 1959-60 International
Agreements on Cyprus, which envisaged that “Republic of Cyprus”
couldn’t join a state or a union to which both Turkey and Greece are not
members. Moreover, since the forcible expulsion of the Turkish Cypriot side
from the partnership Republic by the Greek Cypriot side in 1963, there
exists no single state, government and parliament which have the authority
to represent the island as a whole.
The
TRNC Foreign Affairs and Defence Minister Tahsin Ertuðruloðlu who attended the
summit said on his arrival in the TRNC that “he had been faced with a
conspiracy which had been in the process of being prepared for at least two
years, with the final part of the conspiracy played out in Copenhagen.” Ertuðruloðlu
said, “what they want us to do is to legalize the decision (pre-taken to give
full membership to South Cyprus unilaterally) because by this decision the
so-called 1960 Cyprus Republic has been accepted for the EU membership. Pointing
out that signing any goodwill document in Copenhagen was out of the question,
the Minister said that up until the last minute, the Turkish Cypriot side had
concentrated on trying to persuade the EU not to make this grave mistake. He
added that the necessity of lifting the embargoes on the Turkish Cypriot side
was also put forward, as well as the preservation of the Greco-Turkish
balances”.
The
Turkish Cypriot side stated to the UN in Copenhagen that our desire is to reach
a political settlement on the basis of reconciliation for the establishment of a
new partnership, which entails the recognition of the sovereignty and equality
of both sides in the island, maintains the Greco-Turkish balance, envisages the
continuation of the existing guarantees, and our readiness within this framework
to take up the proposals of the Secretary General. The Turkish Cypriot side made
it clear that it was a big question mark whether the Greek Cypriot
administration, which has once again been unfairly rewarded with the EU
membership on behalf of “Cyprus as a whole”, would actually participate in
future talks with genuine goodwill and determination.
The
fact that the Greek Cypriot side’s intention was to become the sole government
of the island and this approach had been, and continued to be, one of the major
blocks to a solution was expressed once more by President Rauf Denktaþ, on his
arrival in the TRNC on December 7, 2002, after two months of recuperation in New
York.
SECOND
REVISION
Whilst
the two sides continued working on the Plan, the UN Secretary General presented
the second revision of his document on February 26, 2003. The new revisions were
also simple and did not make meaningful changes in order to satisfy the
expectations of the two parties. Instead, the UN set a deadline for signing the
document which was announced as February 28, 2003. The aim was to speed up the
talks between the two sides this time in order to finalise the process before
April 16, the date for the Greek Cypriot administration’s signing the
accession agreement with the EU. The deadline was not welcome on the Turkish
Cypriot side. President Rauf Denktaþ stated for many times that, the TRNC is
ready to work on the document to bring it to the condition that it can be
acceptable for both sides. He said, “We want a solid agreement. An agreement
based on sovereignty. We insist on preserving our sovereignty because we believe
our state is a sovereign state”. The President made it clear that the Greek
Cypriot side did not accept one single modification. Yet, he expressed the
readiness of the Turkish Cypriot side for accepting changes within reasonable
framework of recognition and shared sovereignty.
Tassos
Papadopoulos, the leader of DIKO, who won the election on February 16, 2003 took
over the leadership officially on February 28, from the outgoing Glafcos
Clerides. The change to a new leader in the Greek Cypriot administration was yet
another factor that influenced reaching a settlement in line with the UN
proposals outlined in the document. With a deadline for agreement set on
February 28, Mr. Papadopoulos leaped in at the deep end.
The
election of Mr. Papadopoulos, a well known active member of the Greek Cypriot
terrorist organisation EOKA, who is seen as a nationalist and unbending
conservative was not welcome by the Turkish Cypriots. Though, some people
thought his handling of last minute negotiations might well imperil reaching an
agreement in the short time remaining, this was not realised because, the Greek
Cypriot side also had rejections to the Annan Plan.
ANNAN’S
SECOND VISIT TO CYPRUS
The
UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan, arrived on a three-day visit to Cyprus on
February 26, on the last leg of his tour of Ankara, Athens, and Lefkoþa. Kofi
Annan, officially presented to the two sides the second revision of the UN
“settlement plan”. During his contacts, Annan stated that this was the final
document and that he expected the two leaders to make a decision until February
28 deadline. On the final day of Annan’s visit to the two leaders, it was
announced that the two Presidents accepted to meet Kofi Annan on March 10, 2003
in The Hague. He pointed out that, he invited both sides to say ‘yes and put
their signatures to the plan and to preserve it to their people’. Annan asked
commitment from both sides for separate referenda to take place on March 30, as
it was envisaged in the plan.
MEETING
IN THE HAGUE
Meeting
the UN Secretary General Kofi Annan in The Hague, both President Rauf Denktaþ
and the Greek Cypriot Leader Tassos Papadopoulos rejected to sign the document
and holding referenda on March 30, 2003. Following the completion of a 19-hour
long meeting with harsh debates, in a written statement Annan stated that
“they had reached the end of the road and unfortunately he could not say that
the negotiations had ended successfully”. Although both leaders rejected to
sign the “Annan Plan”, pointing out that it is not yet ready to be taken to
referenda by their peoples, the rejection of Tassos Papadopoulos was overlooked
however, President Denktaþ was put on the spot to be blamed for the failure of
the process.
The
Turkish Cypriot side clarified in every occasion that, the TRNC demands the
recognition of only two main points – a just and sustainable solution that
will not allow history to repeat itself, and the acceptance that democracy is
alive and well in the TRNC. A solution cannot be forced by exerting pressure
from the outside. A just and lasting solution must be based on the sovereign
equality of both parties. For the people of the TRNC, life continues just as it
has been during the decades since 1974 when Turkey was obliged to intervene
under the rights given to it by the 1960 Treaties and halt the Greek Cypriot
massacre of Turkish Cypriots.
The
TRNC made known that it cannot accept a territorial arrangement which purports
to reduce its territory by nearly one third, and promises to displace, in good
time, nearly half of its population, coupled with an extremely complicated
property regime and less than equal share in the government. The TRNC desires to
reach a political settlement on the basis of reconciliation for the
establishment of a new partnership, which entails apart from the recognition for
the establishment of a new partnership, maintains the Greco-Turkish balance and
envisages the continuation of the existing guarantees. However, had the UN
document been signed before negotiated, the TRNC would lose one third of its
territory, its security would have watered down, more than one hundred thousand
Turkish Cypriots, probably for the third time in their lives, would become
refugees, together with the fact that the conditions of their rehabilitation
remained not clarified in the document. Moreover, it did not seem to be
realistically practical.
President
Rauf Denktaþ, launched on April 2, 2003 a new initiative aimed at confidence
building between the two sides through a process of dialogue and consultation,
leading to a comprehensive settlement. President Denktaþ proposed the transfer
of Varosha to the Greek Cypriot control to be opened to resettlement, called for
the lifting of all restrictions on overseas trade, transport, travel and
cultural and sportive activities from and to both parts of Cyprus, to allow
freedom of movement between the two sides including the tourists, and the
establishment of a bilateral Reconciliation Committee which would work for
promoting understanding, tolerance and mutual respect between the two parties.
However, the Greek Cypriot leader Tassos Papadopoulos rejected this move, also.
CROSSINGS
ALLOWED BY THE TRNC
The
Turkish Cypriot side continued taking positive steps for reconciliation and
showed her determination to eliminate enmity between the two peoples by allowing
further dialogue and cooperation both socially and commercially. The TRNC
Council of Ministers allowed free crossings of individuals from and to the
north, since April 23, 2003. The crossings of vehicles also were allowed later
on, which made thousands of Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots to cross the
border and visit the “other side” after 29 years. The Greek Cypriot
authorities again displayed their negative approach against the initiative taken
by the TRNC however, this time it fell on the deaf ears since the Greek Cypriot
civilians did not listen to the warnings and crossed over to the north. They
observed with their own eyes that the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus is a
reality with all its state machinery operating in democracy.
Following
these developments, the announcement of the Turkish Prime Minister Tayyip
Erdoðan who declared that Turkey allowed entrance of the Greek Cypriots to
Turkey without visa, drew considerable appreciation. The visa requirement
for Greek Cypriot citizens to visit Turkey is lifted starting from May 22,
and the Greek Cypriot civilians are enjoying traveling to Turkey with
uncharged tourist visas.
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS BETWEEN 2003 –
2004
The TRNC’s general
elections took place on December 14, 2003. Following the general elections, the
Republican Turkish Party - United Forces (CTP-BG), who secured most of the seats
in the Parliament with 19 MP’s, and the Democrat Party (DP), who came third in
the elections with 7 MP’s, formed a coalition government under the heading,
“The Government For Communal Reconciliation and Settlement”.
The new government was
formed under the leadership of CTP-BG leader, Mehmet Ali Talat who became the Prime Minister.
The leader of DP, Serdar Denktas, handled portfolios of the Deputy Prime
Ministry and the Foreign Ministry. CTP-BG-DP coalition government’s ultimate
aim was resumption of the Cyprus peace talks on the basis of a UN blueprint-
namely, the “Basis for Agreement on a Comprehensive Settlement of the Cyprus
Problem” dated 26 February 2003, to reach a settlement before May 1, the
deadline for the European Union accession of the Greek Cypriot Administration.
Likewise, the Greek Cypriot
leadership expressed before its
willingness for the resumption of substantive negotiations on the basis of the
plan in a letter written to the UN Secretary-General. During their meeting in
Brussels on January 29, 2004, the Greek Cypriot leader Papadopulos reiterated
this call.
Like the new Turkish Cypriot
government, the Turkish government in Ankara
also wanted the recommencement of the Cyprus peace talks within the framework of
the goodwill mission of UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan on the basis of the UN
document.
Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan requested from the UN
Secretary-General to resume Cyprus peace talks during his meeting with him in
Davos on January 24, 2004. Following this, the Greek government in Athens
declared that it supported a renewal of the talks in Cyprus.
Appreciating that the Turkish Cypriots
and the Greek Cypriots as well as their respective motherlands, Turkey and
Greece, wanted resumption of the talks, the UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan sent
a letter to both sides on February 4, 2004 in which he invited them to come to
New York to begin negotiations on February 10, 2004. In his letter, Annan
outlined a schedule according to which talks would resume in Cyprus on February
16 and wrapped up on March 25, after which he would fill in any blanks in a
peace deal that would then be put to a separate referendum in the north and in
the south on April 21.
Although the Turkish Cypriot
leader Denktas and the Greek Cypriot leader Papadopulos had objections and
reservations to the “strict” schedule Annan had proposed, particularly on
issues of agreeing to submit an accord to referendum on April 21 and allowing
the Secretary-General to fill in the blanks in case of disagreement, both leaders
accepted the invitation of the UN Secretary-General and went to New York.
When the UN
Secretary-General Annan and the delegations of the two sides headed by Turkish
Cypriot President Rauf Denktas and Greek Cypriot leader Tasos Papadopulos came
together in New York on February 10, 2004, Annan requested from the sides to
submit their proposals. In his proposal presented to Annan on February 11, 2004,
Denktas offered a timetable that broadly incorporated proposals already made by
Annan. In his proposal, President Denktas offered a three-stage negotiation and
finalization process in which Turkey and Greece would involve in the talks if
the Turkish Cypriot and the Greek Cypriot sides could not agree on issues. He
also proposed enlargement of the role foreseen for the UN Secretary-General,
from completing any unfinished parts of the plan to resolving any continuing and
persistent deadlocks in the negotiations. Following this, the Greek Cypriot side
worried with the involvement of motherlands sought certain clarifications by
demanding a UN Security Council Resolution which would appoint Annan as “the
only authority to fill the gaps”. The Greek Cypriot side also proposed that
the EU become involved in the talks “at some stage considered appropriate”
by the UN Secretary-General. Turkish Cypriot side had accepted everything that
was on the negotiating table, excluding the demand for an active role for the EU
in the process as it would contravene the framework of the Annan plan. UN
Secretary-General Annan considered the proposal by President Denktas as
favourable, therefore he suggested a three-phase negotiation and finalization
process to the sides. He also added the clarifications sought by the Greek
Cypriot side to his final proposal. When the sides declared that they agreed on
the UN Secretary-General’s offer, Annan announced the terms of what was known
as the 13 February agreement, which committed the parties to a three-phase
process leading to referendum on a finalized plan.
Consequently, with a small
deviation from the schedule, negotiations restarted on February 19, 2004 in a
terminal building of which was known once as the Nicosia International Airport
under the chairmanship of the UN Secretary-General’s special envoy, Alvaro de
Soto to reach a negotiated settlement before the May 1. In line with the
agreement reached between the two sides on February 13, 2004, Denktas and
Papadopulos met three times a week and tried to solve their differences, while
three technical committees - one assigned to work on matters related to
international agreements, one on federal legislations needed to be made and one
on matters of economy and finance - met daily. A fourth committee, which worked
on the flag and national anthem of the “new state”, was established towards
the end of February.
During the negotiations, it
was observed that the Turkish Cypriots and the Greek Cypriots were deeply
divided on the complexities and details of the plan. Give-and-take negotiations
between the two sides, which were considered as the most critical stage of the
negotiations, was set to start on March 12. However, since the two sides were
far apart on all outstanding issues, UN envoy on Cyprus Alvaro de Soto did not
launch the give-and-take process. He decided to change the format of the talks
from direct to proximity on March 15. Alvaro de Soto aimed to narrow differences
and facilitate give and take in the run-up to Phase 2 of the process. He put to
each side a framework to allow for trade-offs. While the Turkish Cypriot side
responded positively, the Greek Cypriot side criticized the suggested framework.
The then Turkish Cypriot
President Rauf Denktas announced on March 17 that since no progress had been
achieved on the basic principles during the Cyprus negotiation process, he would
not attend the quadripartite talks between Turkey, Greece and the Turkish
Cypriot and the Greek Cypriot sides in Switzerland, planned to be on March 24. He authorized Prime
Minister Mehmet Ali Talat and the Deputy Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister
Serdar Denktas to represent the Turkish Cypriot side. In order to clear away
some of the secondary issues in the negotiation before the end of the Phase 1,
the leaders came together for one last meeting on the island on March 22. After
this meeting, President Denktas declared that the UN-sponsored bilateral talks
on Cyprus had ended in failure because of the Greek Cypriot rejection of almost
everything proposed by the Turkish Cypriot side. Then, Greek Cypriot leader
Tasos Papadopulos announced that bilateral talks with the Turkish Cypriots on
the UN settlement plan had reached no agreement and he would move to
Switzerland, where Turkey and Greece would join them.
Disagreements between the
two sides primarily centered on the territorial trade-offs, property claims,
security worries and Turkish Cypriot demand for the inclusion of the derogations
in the European Union’s primary law.
The UN-brokered Cyprus talks
entered its second phase on March 24 as Turkey and Greece formally joined the
two rival sides on Cyprus to push for a settlement. Foreign Ministers of Turkey
and Greece, Abdullah Gul and Petros Molyviatis, reciprocally attended to the
meeting in Burgenstock, Switzerland - chaired by UN special envoy for Cyprus,
Alvaro de Soto- together with Greek Cypriot leader Tasos Papadopulos and Turkish
Cypriot Prime Minister Mehmet Ali Talat. Proximity and unofficial talks at a
technical level continued on March 25, between the four participating countries
as the Greek and Greek Cypriot sides tried to impose the idea of holding Cyprus
talks between the two sides of the island instead of holding four-party
conference with the participation of Turkey and Greece.
The summit was halted for
one day on April 25 since Turkish Foreign Minister Abdullah Gul, his Greek
counterpart, Petros Molyviatis, and Greek Cypriot leader Tasos Papadopulos
had to attend the European Union summit, in Brussels.
The summit in Brussels had
considerable importance since the discussions on the Cyprus issue would continue
there also. The Turkish government urged that those terms of a new settlement in
Cyprus should be made part of the Union’s primary law, which meant these
exceptional terms would become permanent derogations from the EU laws. At the
end of the summit, the EU reaffirmed its strong preference for the accession of
a united Cyprus to the EU and reiterated its readiness to accomodate the terms
of such a settlement in line with the principles on which the EU is founded.
Foreign Ministers of Greece
and Turkey, along with the Greek Cypriot leader and Foreign Minister of the
Greek Cypriot side, returned on March 26 to work for a new settlement in
Burgenstock, whilst, the UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan arrived on March 27.
While Greek Prime Minister Kostas Caramanlis arrived in Burgenstock in the
afternoon on March 28, the Turkish Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan came on March
29.
Talks involving the two
premiers, as well as the UN Secretary-General, was the final and decisive round
before Burgenstock talks were wrapped up on March 31. Annan on March 29 revealed
the fourth version of his plan. The 220-page document – accompanied by 9000
pages of appendices- was handed to the parties at a ceremony in Burgenstock.
Annan requested from the sides to present their formal views on the proposals on
March 30 in order to be able to end talks on March 31. Both sides had objections
to the UN’s revised plan. The Greek Cypriot side which gave its submission to
the UN asked for changes on several
provisions of the plan, relating to “Turkish settlers”, restrictions on
Greek Cypriots to live in the north, security issue and exceptions the Turkish
side want from EU law. On the other hand, the Turkish side had reservations on
transition period, which there was a one-year transition period for Northern
Cyprus in an earlier version of the plan but it was dropped in the current one,
composition and duties of the Central Bank, common currency, economic
arrangements for Northern Cyprus and derogations issue.
The main
disputes about the plan were how many Greek and Turkish troops will remain on
the island and rights to property and freedom of movement between the two
communities as well as the rule of EU law. During the talks held between the
Turkish Prime Minister and his Greek counterpart, all outstanding issues,
excluding the issues covered under the derogations, security and property
sub-headlines, were resolved. While the Turkish and Turkish Cypriot governments
were sensitive on accommodation of a Cyprus deal in the primary law of the EU
and were opposed to arrangements on property issues, the Greek Cypriot side was
keen on securing the total withdrawal of Turkish troops.
After
intense negotiations at Burgenstock, leaders of the two sides on the island and
Prime Ministers of Turkey and Greece failed to come up with a compromise
settlement deal. Therefore, it left Annan to fill in the blanks in the UN plan.
After filling the blanks, Annan unveiled the final version of the plan to the
sides at the closing ceremony and declared that referendum in each side of the
island would be held on April 24.
Seperate referanda were held during which the Annan Plan was rejected by 75.8
% "no" votes and approved by 24.2% "Yes" votes in the Greek Cypriot
Administration. In contrary, it was approved by the 64.9% "Yes" votes and 35.1%
"No" votes in the TRNC. Since, the Greek Cypriot Administration rejected the
Comprehensive Settlement Plan in Cyprus (the Annan Plan) it could not be put
into effect.
Such a strong "no" from the Greek Cypriot side, demonstrated
that neither the Greek Cypriot leadership nor the Greek Cypriot people are ready
to enter into a power-sharing arrangement with the Turkish Cypriots. Despite the
absence of a political settlement in the island and the Greek Cypriot side's
responsibility for it, Southern Cyprus was unjustly admitted to the European
Union on 1 May 2004. Exploiting the privileges of its new EU membership, the
Greek Cypriot administration is continuing vehemently its campaign of isolating
the Turkish Cypriot people.
DEVELOPMENTS AFTER THE
REFERENDUM
In line with the attempt to
end the isolation of the Turkish Cypriots and to reward the Turkish Cypriots
for their support of a UN-proposed peace plan in 2004, the EU stated its
determination to put an end to the isolation of the Turkish Cypriot people
so as to facilitate the unification of Cyprus by encouraging the economic
development of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. Therefore, the EU
General Affairs Council decided for 259 million euro financial assistance
for the TRNC be left free on 26 April 2004. After the EU Council’s decision,
the European Commission prepared an aid package in July 2004, comprising
commercial and financial regulations, and to start direct trade between the
North and the EU.
After the referendum, the
TRNC authorities intensified their contacts with the world to demand ending
of the inhuman isolation and the illegal embargoes imposed upon the Turkish
Cypriots. The
embargoes imposed on the Turkish Cypriot people range from denying the right
of representation in the international fora; to preventing or restricting
their travel abroad as well as their communication with the outside world;
to curtailing the trade and tourism between North Cyprus and the outside
world; to hampering all cultural and sporting relations with other countries;
and to attempting to prevent the academic cooperation of the TRNC
universities with the universities of other countries. As a result of the
Greek Cypriot obstructions, direct flights cannot take place to and from the
TRNC, exports of products like the citrus fruit and potatoes to Europe
through our ports are prevented, we cannot participate in any international
sporting activity, and so forth.
President Mehmet Ali Talat
who was Prime Minister then met with the UN Secretary General Kofi Annan in
New York, on 3 May 2004, during which issues like unjust treatment of the
TRNC and expectations of the Turkish Cypriots from the international
community, including the lifting of isolation of Turkish Cypriots were held.
Then Prime Minister Talat, also met with the US Secretary of State Colin
Powell at the UN Headquarters, on 4 May 2004, after which the Prime Minister
said the US had prepared a comprehensive package aimed at ending the
isolation of the Turkish Cypriot side. He also announced that the US warmly
welcomed the issue of direct flights to the TRNC.
The most pleasing development
for the Turkish Cypriot people in 2004 took place during the Organisation of
Islamic Conference (OIC) meeting held between 14-16 June 2004, in Istanbul.
The Islamic Countries approved a resolution that upgraded the status of the
Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus from "Turkish Muslim People of Cyprus"
to "Turkish Cypriot State", as it was called in the Annan Plan. Resolution
called upon the international community to take immediate concrete steps
aimed at ending the isolation of the Turkish Cypriots and furthermore calls
were made to the Islamic countries requesting the lifting of the political
and economic isolation of the TRNC and for initiating economic ties with
North Cyprus.
Azerbaijan supported the
resolution adopted in the OIC and the UN Secretary General’s call in ending
the isolation. An important step towards lifting the 31 years long isolation
of the Turkish Cypriots was taken with the first direct flight from
Azerbaijan to the TRNC on 27 July 2005 and on 29 August 2005 from Ercan to
Haydar Aliyev Airport in Baku. It was scheduled that flights would continue
between the two states, however, it could not due to the pressure exerted by
the Greek Cyriot side and Greece on Azerbaijan through the EU.
The visit paid by President
Mehmet Ali Talat to the USA upon an official invitation from the US
Secretary of State Condolezza Rice was a clear indication of US Government’s
continued support to the efforts aimed at bringing about a solution to the
Cyprus problem and lifting the isolation on the Turkish Cypriot people. This
was a significant development as it was the highest-level invitation from
the US administration to date. In other words, the meeting was crucial as a
Turkish Cypriot leader was received in the office of the Secretary of State
for the first time. During his meeting with Condolezza Rice on 28 October
2005, President Talat reiterated his call for the lifting of the isolations,
he requested the encouragement of the other countries by the USA for taking
the necessary steps in this direction and the continuation of further
initiatives in trying to achieve a settlement. During his US visit,
President Talat also met with Kofi Annan on 31 October 2005. President Talat
on his return stated that Kofi Annan reiterated his support on the justified
request of the Turkish Cypriot people.
In early 2006, the Foreign
Minister of the Turkish Republic Abdullah Gul launched a new initiative
aimed at overcoming the problems arising from the lack of solution in Cyprus
by proposing an Action Plan on 24 January 2006
(see documents). The Action Plan constituted 10 principal elements,
which envisaged the opening of Turkish ports and airports to Greek Cypriot
ships and planes in return for the lifting of the embargo on trade and other
restrictions against the Turkish Cypriots. Turkey proposed reviving UN talks
on the reunification of Cyprus and offered the elimination of all
restrictions for both sides in Cyprus, providing substantial benefits to all
parties and promoting socio-economic development by reducing disparities
between the two sides. Although the proposal was welcomed by the
international community, the Greek Cypriots rejected.
British Foreign Secretary
Jack Straw arrived the island on 24 January 2006. Despite the Greek Cypriot
administration’s objections, Straw crossed over to the Turkish Republic of
Northern Cyprus and met with President Talat at the Presidential Palace.
Following the meeting which drew severe Greek Cypriot criticism, Straw
organized a press conference at the Ledra Palace Hotel and said the UN
Secretary-General Kofi Annan supported his visit and contacts on the island
and added progress had to be achieved on lifting the Turkish Cypriot side’s
isolation as it was in everybody’s interest to bring the Turkish Cypriots
closer to the EU. Meanwhile, in a press conference organized at the TRNC
Presidency, Talat said his meeting with Straw at the Presidential Palace was
a sign of the UK’s respect for the Turkish Cypriot people and added that he
had expressed during the meeting the Turkish Cypriot side’s commitment to
peace and settlement and the desire to achieve a settlement during 2006.
Within the framework of
easing the Turkish Cypriots isolation, the Spokesman for the US Secretary of
State, Adam Ereli indicated on 21 February 2006 that the USA would start
direct trade with the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus and said "we are
seeking ways of eliminating the economic isolations imposed on the North.
There are number of steps we have taken". Following this statement, during a
State Department’s daily briefing on 26 February 2006, Ereli stated that, "trade
with North Cyprus is legal".
Recent Political Developments
2005-2007
Since
their destruction of the 1960 Republic of Cyprus through force of arms, the
main aim of the Greek Cypriot side has been to constantly deny the Turkish
Cypriot people any opportunity to engage in political, economical, social,
cultural and sporting contacts with the rest of the world, aiming to bring
about their collapse in all these fields.
While the
Turkish Cypriot side is subjected to all kinds of restrictions in all fields,
the Greek Cypriot side continues to enjoy the benefits of the title of the "Republic
of Cyprus" which they have usurped. To put an end to this injustice and find
its rightful place within the international community, the Turkish Cypriot
side has always supported efforts towards finding a comprehensive settlement
to the Cyprus problem under the good offices mission of the UN
Secretary-General.
It is in this spirit that the Turkish Cypriot side has participated at the
UN-sponsored negotiations for decades. However, the Greek Cypriot side has
made it clear, at every opportunity, that the Greek Cypriots do not want a
settlement based on the principles of political equality and bi-zonality.
Despite
the absence of a political settlement in the island and the Greek Cypriot
side's responsibility for it, Southern Cyprus was unjustly admitted to the
European Union on 1 May 2004. Exploiting the privileges of its new EU
membership, the Greek Cypriot administration is continuing vehemently its
campaign of isolating the Turkish Cypriot people.
Immediately after the referenda, the UN
Secretary-General then Kofi Annan stressed in his report to the
Security Council dated 28 May 2004 (S/2004/437) that referenda results had
undone whatever rational might have existed for pressuring and isolating the
Turkish Cypriots and called upon the international community to cooperate
both bilaterally and in international bodies to
eliminate
unnecessary restrictions and barriers that have the effect of isolating the
Turkish Cypriots and impeding their development. It is unfortunate that
Secretary-General’s Report has not yet been endorsed by the Security Council
due to the pressure by the Greek-Greek Cypriot duo. The Secretary-General
also expressed his regrets in his statement of 24 April 2004 that the
Turkish Cypriots would not equally enjoy the benefits of the EU membership,
but he hoped
that ways
would be found to ease the plight in which the people find themselves
through no fault of their own.
The
European Council of Foreign Ministers concluded on 26 April 2004 that "the
Turkish Cypriot people have expressed their clear desire for a future within
the EU. The Council is determined to put an end to the isolation of the
Turkish Cypriot community and to facilitate the reunification of Cyprus by
encouraging the economic development of the Turkish Cypriot people." The
EU
Commission proposed an aid package aimed at ending the isolation on the
Turkish Cypriots on 7 July 2004. The proposal envisaged the transfer of 259
million Euros financial aid and to enable direct trade with the Turkish
Republic of Northern Cyprus. European Council of Foreign Ministers could
only approve the Financial Aid Regulation on 27 February 2006 due to Greek
Cypriot obstructionist efforts. Yet, this decision did not meet the
expectations of the Turkish Cypriots whose main expectation has been the
initiation of direct trade. However, the direct trade regulation, which is
vital for the economic development of the Turkish Cypriot people, is still
pending.
In light
of the fact that, progress to find a settlement based on political equality
and bi-zonality can only be achieved by positive contributions of both sides
in the island. The Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus and Turkey have been
putting forward numerous initiatives for reconciliation, regardless of the
Greek Cypriot intransigence. Turkey took an initiative on 30 May 2005 by
proposing
the total elimination of the restrictions on all sides, which was rejected,
out of hand, by the Greek Cypriot administration. It then proposed the "Action
Plan" on 24 January 2006, which envisaged the opening of the sea and
airports of Turkey to Greek Cypriot vessels in return of lifting
international restrictions on the TRNC.
The
Turkish Cypriot side has also adopted a constructive approach and taken
concrete unilateral steps designed to break the impasse in the process and
to contribute to building confidence between the two peoples. In this regard,
it should be noted that the idea to establish technical committees between
the Turkish and Greek Cypriot sides was originally suggested by the
Turkish
Cypriot side, with a view to overcome the difficulties that arise in the
daily life of both Turkish and Greek Cypriot peoples. Unfortunately, the
Turkish Cypriot side did not receive any positive response to its suggestion
from the Greek Cypriot administration. However, when the Greek Cypriot
leader, Mr. Tassos Papadopoulos, met with the UN Secretary-General in Paris
on 28 February 2006, he alleged that an agreement was reached in Paris to
include substantive issues to the proposed technical talks which can only be
discussed within the framework of the comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus
problem and put pre-conditions for the initiation of the talks at the
technical level.
Later in
his letter dated 20 March 2006 addressed to President H.E. Mr. Mehmet Ali
Talat, UN Under-Secretary- General for Political Affairs, Mr. Ibrahim
Gambari, confirmed that "there was no unilateral agreement on issues that
quite clearly have to be agreed by both sides".
As a
result of the efforts of the UN, the two leaders came together on 8 July
2006, with the presence of Ibrahim Gambari, at the UN residence in the
Buffer Zone. The two leaders agreed on five principles including "finding a
comprehensive settlement based on bi-zonality and political equality, and on
the formation of working groups and technical committees until the end of
July".
However,
since no progress has been achieved and the technical committees which
should have been running as of 31 July 2006 are yet to be established, the
UN Secretary-General's Under-Secretary for Political Affairs Ibrahim Gambari
wrote yet another letter addressed to the two leaders, which was received by
both sides on 16 November, 2006, consisting of his thoughts
and
proposals for the implementation of 8 July Agreement. The Turkish Cypriot
side responded immediately reiterating its readiness for progress.
Within
this context, the talks of the representatives of the two sides appointed by
the leaders,
respectively, for
preparing
the
ground for
the
resumption
of fullyfledged
negotiations not
later than
the first
quarter of
2007
have been
embarked
but has
so far not
borne
any fruit
because of
the Greek
Cypriot
side's
delaying tactics. It is beyond doubt that the impasse in the UN process
stems from the Greek Cypriot side's efforts to extract unilateral
concessions from Turkey within the context of Turkey-EU accession
negotiations.
President
Talat and the UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan met in Geneva just before he
resigned
to discuss
the latest developments on 20 November 2006. The President and the Secretary-
General shared their views on the UN's comprehensive settlement plan and
focused on the importance of ceasing the isolation of the Turkish Cypriot
people. Following the said meeting, the UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan
openly called for the removal of the isolation the Turkish Cypriot people
are being subjected to. He reiterated in his report of 1 December 2006 that
the international isolation of the TRNC should be lifted and a comprehensive
settlement found in the island. However, the Turkish Cypriot people are
still being subjected to the Greek Cypriot restrictions, now enforced with
added impetus of the benefits rewarded to them through EU membership whereas
the Turkish Cypriot side has been left on its own devices as none of the
promises
made by the international community have been kept so far.
It is
unfortunate that, the Greek Cypriot obstructionist policies and hostilities
against Turkish Cypriots have been continuing which would only help to
deepen the mistrust between the two peoples, thus bringing about eventual
division of the island. President Talat has called upon the
international community and the UN to take action to end all kinds of racism,
religious discrimination as well as cruel and inhuman treatment of the
Turkish Cypriots. He drew attention to the increasing racism and ultra-nationalism
in the Greek Cypriot side by giving concrete evidence and underlining the
concerns of the Turkish Cypriot people in this regard.
Clearly
the continued non-settlement of the issue has provided the Greek Cypriot
side with the opportunity to continue its assault against the Turkish
Cypriots in a more disguised fashion in the form of total isolation. The
Greek Cypriot leadership is holding out the Turkish Cypriots will eventually
surrender and accept Greek Cypriot terms for a final settlement. The Turkish
Cypriot
side
remains committed to a comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus issue based on
bi-zonality and political equality under the good offices mission of the UN
Secretary-General.
Developments in 2008
After a year of almost no progress, President Mehmet Ali Talat and
the Greek Cypriot leader Demetris Christofias came together for the first time
on 21 March 2008, following the “Presidential” elections in the Greek Cypriot
administration. The election of AKEL Leader Demetris Christofias, as the new
Greek Cypriot Leader, raised the expectations for progress in the negotiations.
During the meeting, the two leaders decided to ask their respective
advisers ( Presidential Senior Aide Özdil Nami and the Greek Cypriot Aide
Yorgos Iacovou) to meet soon in order to set up a number of Working Groups and
Technical Committees, establish their agendas and to work in the “most
expeditious way possible”. The two leaders agreed, amongst other things, to
start full-fledged negotiations following a three months preparation period.
Moreover, they decided that Lokmacý Gate (Ledra Street), which had been closed
since 1963, would be opened as soon as technically possible and function in
accordance with the established practices at other crossings. The issues of
opening a check-point in Yeþilýrmak (Limnidi) and in some other places were also
discussed.
As envisaged by the two leaders during the meeting, the Presidential
Senior Aide Özdil Nami and the Greek Cypriot Aide Yorgos Iacovou came together
to facilitate the Technical Committees and Working Groups. They established six
Working Groups to discuss the core issues of the Cyprus problem and seven
Technical Committees to discuss matters relating to day to day affairs.
The Technical Committees were set up to discuss issues like; Crime/Criminal
Matters, Economic and Commercial Matters, Cultural Heritage, Crisis Management,
Humanitarian Matters, Health and Environment Issues. Whereas, the Working Groups
were set up to discuss the issues of Governance and Power-sharing, EU matters,
Security and Guarantees, Territory, Property and Economic Matters. The Working
Groups were established with the view to engaging in brain storming, exchanging
ideas and gathering a body of work to place before the two leaders.
The first remarkable development following the meeting on 21 March,
was the opening of the Lokmacý Gate for pedestrian crossing on 3 April 2008,
after serious de-mining and elimination of booby traps in the buffer zone.
The next meeting of the two leaders took place on 23 May 2008, at the residence
of the UN Secretary General’s Special Representative for Cyprus Taye- Brook
Zerihoun. The two leaders had genuine and fruitful discussions, reviewed the
results achieved pursuant to the previous meeting and reaffirmed their
commitment to a bi-zonal, bi-communal federation with political equality as
defined by relevant Security Council Resolutions. They reiterated that, this
partnership would have a Federal Government with a single international
personality, as well as a Turkish Cypriot Constituent State and a Greek Cypriot
Constituent State, which would be of equal status.
The studies of the Technical Committees and Working Groups started to bear fruit
by June 2008. The two aides of the leaders announced (on 20 June 2008) that
Technical Committee on Cultural Heritage agreed to prepare educational programs
in connection with cultural heritage, while the Committee on Crime and Criminal
Matters reached agreement on road safety. The two aides declared that the
Committee on Health has agreed on the crossing of ambulance in emergency cases
and on the establishment of the Cyprus joint committee on health. In addition to
these, the Committee on Environment agreed on the establishment of cooperation
for island-wide assessment of all major waste stream qualitatively and
quantitatively, and for environmental education.
On 1 July 2008, the two leaders came together for the first time and undertook
the first review of the work of the Technical Committees and Working Groups
which were established to prepare the ground for full-fledged negotiations. The
two leaders discussed during the meeting the issues of single sovereignty and
citizenship. President Talat and the Greek Cypriot Leader Christofias declared
to the public after the meeting that, they agreed on these issues in principle
and decided to take them up again during the full-fledged negotiations.
President Talat and the Greek Cypriot Leader Christofias met for the second time
in July, (on 25 July 2008) and undertook the final review of the work carried
out by Working Groups and Technical Committees. During the meeting, they decided
to start full-fledged negotiations under the good offices mission of the UN
Secretary-General on 3 September 2008. Moreover, they approved sixteen more
measures of the studies of the Technical Committees in the areas of environment,
cultural heritage, crisis management, crime and criminal matters and gave
instructions for their immediate and full implementation.
The leaders also agreed to establish a secure hotline to facilitate
direct contact between them.
As it was envisaged, the new negotiations process was re-launched
on 3 September 2008, which was a ceremonial meeting at the official residence of
Mr. Taye-Brook Zerihoun, the UN Secretary General’s Special Representative in
Cyprus. This was followed by the meetings on 11 and 18 September 2008, during
which the two leaders discussed on the issues of “governance and power sharing”.
Both meetings took place at a building allocated for the talks at the old
Lefkosa Airport in the UN controlled buffer zone. After the meetings, the two
leaders explained that there were many issues to be discussed and negotiations
would take time, thus eliminating the expectations of a settlement until the end
of the year.
Next meeting of the two Leaders within the framework of the full-fledged
negotiations took place, on 14 October 2008. The two leaders resumed
discussions on the subject of the executive branch of the joint government.
Furthermore, they decided to hold their meetings on weekly basis.
Alexander Downer, the Secretary-General’s Special Adviser on Cyprus, after
the meeting told the press that, “There is a growing understanding between
the two sides of their positions, and as time goes on, of course, the gaps
were going to narrow.” He also added, “It’s going to take a long time and
it’s going to be a difficult negotiation. But what you have here is a
political will, and the political will is very good” (13 October 2008). |
