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Page 12
INTERCOMMUNAL TALKS
1968-1974
Turkish
concessions
CLERIDES
- MAKARIOS Disagreement
MAKARIOS
defies Athens
Turkish
position
Fruistless efforts
Conflict
betweenMakarios,GrivasandAthens
In early 1968, UN
Secretary-General U Thant proposed the initiation of bi-communal talks. Both
sides responded positively and the first meeting between Denktas and
Clerides took place on 23 May.
The first phase of talks
continued until 28 August 1968.
Denktas concluded that, during
the talks, the Turkish Cypriot concessions were very substantial. In return
the Turkish Cypriot side demanded that any future agreement should continue
to guarantee Cyprus against Enosis or union with another country, and the
local autonomy to be the basis for a final settlement in recognition of the
partnership status of the Turkish Community
... Although there was a wide
degree of agreement on the `functions' of the local authorities and on the
issue of `local autonomy' the Greek Cypriot side was reluctant to give any
meaningful autonomy to the Turks.
Clerides admitted that, "Any
objective person examining the list of additional powers and functions
proposed by the Turkish Cypriot side would have come to the conclusion that
they were well within what is accepted generally as normal local government
functions.
Certainly such powers and
functions were not much wider than those laws of Cyprus which were enacted
by the British Administration, when local government was first introduced in
the island and was in an undeveloped form."
(Clerides, op. cit, p. 237 )
As a matter of fact the Turkish
Cypriot side had made such substantial concessions that almost all the
provisions of the constitution which granted special rights for the Turkish
Community as a co-founder partner, and as were proposed by Makarios to be
altered or completely removed, were now accepted.
Clerides wrote to Makarios on 28
June 1968 and explained to him the Turkish Cypriot concessions. Makarios
thought that the Greek Cypriot side could not reject Denktas's proposals but
despite that, the reply of the Greek side had to be delayed for tactical
reasons in order to induce for further Turkish concessions.
Clerides had strongly urged
Makarios to accept the proposals of Denktas and explained to Makarios that
the powers proposed for local authorities were far below the powers of a
canton in a federal state.
However Makarios rejected the
Turkish Cypriot proposals and thus the first round of talks which lasted
more than 2 years ended without agreement.
The second phase of the
intercommunal talks started on 29 August 1968 and lasted on 3 January 1970.
Meanwhile Turkish and Greek
Foreign Ministers, Pipinellis and Caglayangil, met several times and made
parallel efforts to solve the problems which created difficulties during
Denktas-Clerides talks.
Clerides reveals that there had
been disagreement between himself as interlocutor and Makarios on the issues
of local Government. However, Makarios had a different point of view which
is explained as follows:
"Our main aim should be to
reduce the Turkish Community's political status to that of minority,
acknowledging autonomy only on such matters as religion, education, culture,
personal status but not in local Government."
(Ibid, p. 272-3 )
Clerides admits that he `tried
to convince Makarios that a more developed system of local government would
be needed, which should contain, at least, some element of autonomy, with
less control by the Government'.
(Ibid, p. 273 )
Even the Greek Premier
Papadopoulos and Foreign Minister Pipinellis who had several encouraging
meetings with their Turkish counterparts, had not been able to convince
Makarios to accept Turkish proposals for self-government.
On 5 January 1969 at a meeting
in Athens Pipinellis expressed his view that `from the Turkish side there
was a sincere wish to find a solution' and concluded that the Greek side
should be more flexible on the issue of local government.
(Ibid, p. 290 )
The Greek Premier Papadopoulos
warned Makarios that if Turkey attacked, Greece would not be in a position
to help Cyprus.
Therefore he added, "we must
achieve a solution to the problem, before a solution is forced on us."
But Makarios insisted that the
subject of local government was a matter of serious concern for him and that
he was not prepared to back down on that issue.
With this intransigent position
of the Greek Cypriot side the second phase of intercommunal talks ended. The
Greek Cypriot leaders thought that the Turks would capitulate and accept the
Greek side's terms, under the pressure of their tottering economy.
"Makarios felt we should move
slowly."
(Ibid, p. 312 )
On 10 November 1969 the Turkish
Premier, Süleyman Demirel, stated that `the Cyprus problem was a national
problem' and the main objective of the Turkish government was to reach a
solution `satisfying the rights and interests of Turkey and the Turkish
Cypriot Community' .
He also underlined that Turkey
wanted the independence of Cyprus to continue and that the only way to
revive the independent Cyprus state was to reach a settlement through
negotiations. Demirel added that, such a solution would, without any doubt,
affect positively Greco-Turkish relations.
The third phase of the talks
started on 1 December 1969. Denktas proposed that `as no agreement was
reached on local government it would be better to leave that issue aside and
try to resolve the differences on the constitution, scaling down the Turkish
Cypriot rights.' But, "once again the characteristic attitude of the Greek
Cypriot leadership to stick on to positions, ... played its damaging part,
and an opportunity to reach agreement with the Turkish side on the basis of
a considerable improvement of the Zurich agreements was lost."
(Ibid, p.359 )
That was how Clerides explained
the failure to reach an agreement.
Denktas stated that, " For over
two years the talks dragged on with fruitless exchanges of views.
... The Turkish side drew up a
comprehensive list of such matters which needed consideration. The Turks
expected that an agreement on non-political issues would enhance the chances
of success in the international talks."
(Denktas, op. cit, p.55 )
Instead, on 14 March 1971,
Makarios made a speech at Yialousa village which proved that such
expectations were void.
Makarios declared:
"Cyprus is Greek. Cyprus has
been Greek since the dawn of history and will remain Greek. Greek and
undivided we have taken it over; Greek and undivided we shall preserve it.
Greek and undivided we shall deliver it to Greece."
According to Denktas, at a time
when intercommunal talks was focused on a solution based on independence
such a provocative declaration by Makarios was a very serious blow to all
efforts.
..."and so talks broke down
after the last meeting on 20 September 1971."
(Ibid, p.55 )
Clerides regretted that a
solution was not reached during his talks with Denktas and blamed the Greek
Cypriot side for this failure.
"The irony of the situation is
that in 1970 we were refusing to grant autonomy to the Turkish Cypriot
community on local Government. The justification for our refusal was that it
constituted a form of concealed federation.
... If today we were offered the
solution which was possible in 1970 we would grasp it with both hands and we
would be celebrating a tremendous success."
(Clerides, op. cit, p. 381 )
The Greek Government of Colonels
was resolute in sorting out the Cyprus question on a basis which would both
help to improve the Greco-Turkish relations and defuse the Cyprus problem.
It was therefore willing to accept the local government proposition
(autonomy) for Turkish Cypriots. In a letter to Makarios on 18 June 1971,
Papadopoulos warned that "if Makarios insisted on breaking the common front,
the Greek Government would have to act in the national interests of Cyprus
Hellenism, however `painful' that might be."
(Stanley Mayes, Makarios, p.112
)
Makarios rejected this warning,
risking the worsening of relations with the Greek military Government. In
his letter of 4 August 1971 to Papadopoulos he plainly rejected the
proposition that the Greek Government would have a final say in resolving
the Cyprus problem.
(Clerides, vol III, p. 3 )
As a matter of fact, during the
next two years the rift between Makarios and Athens reached the limits of no
return.
Meanwhile the Greek Government
initiated the talks with Turkey at the level of Foreign Ministers which
continued in an encouraging way both between Pipinellis and Caglayangil
first and then between Palamas and O. Olcay, from 1968 to 1972.
The Conflict between the Greek
military Government and the Makarios regime reached its climax in the early
1970's.
In September 1971, Grivas once
more arrived secretly to Cyprus and immediately started underground
activities against both the intercommunal talks and the hegemony of
Makarios.
Clerides reveals that he knew
that Grivas and his supporters were opposed to the intercommunal talks and
observed: "They wanted Greece to negotiate the Enosis question directly with
Turkey... and if necessary to force Makarios to declare Enosis.
... In their view in such on
event , the USA and NATO would intervene to prevent a war between Greece and
Turkey."
(Ibid p.111 )
Thus union with Greece would
have become a permanent de-facto situation.
With the arrival of Grivas to
Cyprus the polarization of the Greek Cypriots accelerated.
Grivas had immediately formed a
pro-Enosis underground organization, called EOKAB, to challenge the
authority and policy of Makarios. Meanwhile Makarios was importing arms
mostly from Czechoslovakia.
According to Clerides "these
arms were not imported in order to strengthen the (Greek) National Guard,
but to arm the supporters of Makarios, in order to defend him and his
Government from a coup likely to be stoped by Greek Forces in Cyprus, and
against attacks by Grivas's underground organization EOKA B."
(Ibid, pp. 124-5 )
The Greek Government demanded
that the imported Czech weapons should be handed over to the United Nations
Force.
The Greek Cypriot police force
was also divided. Many of them were EOKA B members and had connection with
terrorist activities.
Makarios had to rely only on
private armed groups sympathizing with him and who were armed by him, such
as the armed groups of the socialist leader Dr. Vassos Lyssarides. On the
other hand, the former Minister of Interior, Yiorgadjis and EOKA gunman
Nikos Sampson had their own private armies directed against Makarios.
Markides says that, "Order was
based on the balance of terror.
... Whenever EOKA B struck
against supporters of the Government (of Makarios), an equal amount of
damage was inflicted on the supporters of EOKA B."
(Markides, the Rise and Fall of
the Cyprus Republic, p.161. )
As a result of this bitter feud,
the helicopter of Makarios was attacked by gunmen from the roof of the
Pancyprian Gymnasium, opposite the Archbishopric. Makarios escaped unhurt.
His pilot was seriously wounded but managed to land safely.
The former Interior Minister,
Yiorgadjis, the mastermind of the Akritas plan, had been the target of
Makarios supporters as being the main instigator of the attack. Only one
week after the helicopter incident he was shot dead in his car somewhere
near Kythrea, 3 miles away from Nicosia.
Makarios launched a press
campaign in the summer of 1973 against the Greek Military and published a
newspaper called Eleftheros Laos (Free People) which openly advocated the
expulsion of Greek mainland officers.
It also called upon King
Constantine and former premier Karamanlis to set up a Greek Government
in-exile in Nicosia.
As a result, Cyprus had become a
rallying point of Greeks who disliked the junta regime and wished to
re-establish the Monarchy.
(P. Oberling, Op, Cit, P. 154 )
Grivas died of a heart attack on
27 January 1974 in his hide-out in Limassol. Makarios thought that he could
cope easily with EOKA B terror as their leader was dead. But EOKA B
prevailed and its struggle became more violent. The anti-Makarios elements
demanded the removal of all `Anti-Hellenes' from the government and asked
Makarios to step down as president. They asked nothing short of a virtual
take over.
(Markides, Op. Cit, p. 165 )
After the death of Grivas, who
defied Athens from time to time, EOKA B came under the control of the
military government in Athens. Under such circumstances Makarios decided to
send a letter to the president of Greece, General Phaedon Gizikis on 2 July
1974, asking him to remove the Greek officers from Cyprus.
He claimed that, "the Greek
officers' support of `EOKA B' is in reality an undeniable fact" and that, "
the opposition press, which supports the criminal activities of `EOKA B', is
financed by Athens."
Then, he bluntly accused the
military regime with the following passages: "I regret to say, Mr.
President, that, THE ROOT OF EVIL IS TOO DEEP AND REACHES AS FAR AS ATHENS.
From there, it is fed and from there it is conserved and spreads growing
into a tree of evil; the bitter fruit of which Greek Cypriots are tasting
today. And in order to be more and absolutely specific I state that members
of the military regime of Greece support and direct the activities of the
terrorist organization, `EOKA B' . This explains the involvement of Greek
officers of the National guard in the illegal actions, conspiracies and
other unacceptable situations."
..."In the effort to dissolve
the state of Cyprus great is the responsibility of the Greek Government. The
Cyprus state can only be dissolved in the case of Enosis. Since, however,
the Enosis is not feasible it is imperative to strengthen the statehood of
Cyprus."
..."And I would request that the
Greek officers serving in the National Guard be recalled.
..."It must however, be borne in
mind that I am not an appointed prefect, or locum-tenens of the Greek
Government in Cyprus, but an elected leader of a large section of Hellenism
and I demand an appropriate conduct by the National Guard towards me."
This letter of Makarios had
diminished any serious hope of cooperation or joint efforts between the
Archbishop and the Greek military government.
The die was cast. Both sides had
reached to a point of NO RETURN .
On 5 July Makarios sent an
emissary to the exiled King of Greece in England and to the self-exiled
former Greek premier Karamanlis in Paris to brief them on the gravity of the
situation.
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