Experts' Opinions 

CYPRUS TODAY
By DR. CHRISTIAN HEINZE- 29^th January 2002

• There are no news as yet of substantial changes in conflicting positions.
• What does the conflict consist in ?
• Joining the EU: A state of Cyprus composed of  two communal states, or a Greek state of South Cyprus provided its acceptance is linked to an association of the Turkish communal state with the EU.
• Some accents in media publications are counterproductive.
• The ideal solution and the alternatives: inter alia Turkish-American approachment.

***

There are no news as yet of substantial changes in conflicting positions.

Discussion of the Cyprus conflict is being resumed by the media since the leaders of the two Cypriot communities have begun, in December 2001, to talk to each other again. This became possible when they renounced to certain preconditions for negotiation. These were the Greek-Cypriot condition that UN-resolutions must be heeded, according to which Cyprus must be a single sovereign state with a single citizenship, and the Turkish-Cypriot condition that sovereignty of the Turkish Cypriot republic must be recognized beforehand. However, both parties continue to adhere to these condition for a solution of the conflict. It is therefore an exaggeration to claim that a "solution was emerging" (Handelsblatt 4.12.2001).
 

What does the conflict consist in ?

The media are occupied with the possibilities of an agreement. This requires remembrance of what the conflict essentially consists in. Since the 1950ies it consisted in the aim of the Greek Cypriots to govern themselves and the whole island without restrictions by Turkish Cypriot privileges, as opposed to the aim of the Turkish Cypriots not to be reduced to the status of a minority under a Greek government. Since 1974 at the latest, Greek and Turkish Cypriots govern themselves without any such restriction. A purely Greek Cypriot state rules  two thirds of the territory of the island. A purely Turkish Cypriot State governs the other third. Insofar, the conflicting parties have achieved their goals (contrary to Süddeutsche Zeitung of 18.1.2002), and particularly so in very important respects, and there can be no question of a policy having led into a blind alley as has sometimes been suggested (Neue Zürcher Zeitung 23.4.2001 and Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 23.1.2002 "Hoffnung und Skepsis"). Since then, the conflict consists in the whole world supporting the claim made by the Greek Cypriot State to extend its jurisdiction to the other third of the island, as opposed to the resistance of the Turkish Cypriots against giving up their right to self determination. The conflict also comprises contrasting interests of Greece and Turkey in Cyprus which parallel the conflict between the two Cypriot states. As Cyprus is important for Greece as a basis for developments of all kinds in competition or disputes with Turkey, so is a limitation of Greek rule over Cyprus for Turkey.
 

Joining the EU: A state of Cyprus composed of  two communal states, or a Greek state of South Cyprus, provided its acceptance is linked to an association of the Turkish communal state with the EU.

As regards the question of an agreement, it follows that a compromise can be envisaged in the form of recognition of partition or of return to a solution as has been tried in 1959/60. Such return would very soon confront the Turks of  Cyprus once again with the alternative to submit to Greek predominance or to defend themselves against it. Another possibility could be envisaged as a combination of the two alternatives. As chances for agreement are concerned, one prospect is certain, namely that an agreement must accept all commitments connected with membership in the European Union. For it is quite obvious that an agreement is being discussed in order to facilitate accession of Cyprus to the European Union. These commitments concern the binding validity of legal acts in the acceding state as well as the participation of this state within the organs of the European Union. Accession of the Turkish republic of North Cyprus is hardly being considered. But if the Turkish demand for recognition of the state quality of this republic is upheld, it follows that an agreement must cover either the formation of a state of "Cyprus" composed of both communities, or an isolated accession of the Greek Republic of South Cyprus. An isolated accession of  South Cyprus could probably be acceptable to Turkey, if it is linked to a provisional arrangement similar to a status of association for the Turkish Republic of North Cyprus covering the time until the accession of Turkey comes about. Such an arrangement could also provide guidelines for the final status of Cyprus within the European Union as of Turkish accession.

Unification within a common state of Cyprus appears more difficult. Should statehood remain denied to the Turkish Cypriots, then new Greek strategies for predominance would emerge and a continuation of the conflict from a point as has already been reached in 1963 would be as certain as the amen in a sermon, because the distribution of powers in the eastern mediterranean region and in the island itself as well as vital interests of Turkey weigh more heavily than any inconsistent agreement. The concession of Turkish-Cypriot statehood alone will provide a chance for peace. A state of Cyprus would have to be formed by a Greek Cypriot and a Turkish Cypriot communal state. But this would overcome just one of several high hurdles. It is true that the exercise of legislative, executive and judicial powers as well as certain matters like internal security could become matters within the exclusive authority of the two communal states respectively. But need would arise for an effective protection of the Turkish interests in the observation of the duties and rights connected with a membership of Cyprus in the European Union and in connection with the immediate application of the European law, which covers a great part of  all state activities to be envisaged , in the whole island. The Turkish side could probably be prepared to concede representation of Cyprus in the European Union to common organs, even if they were largely under Greek control, because the interests of the Turkish Cypriots to be looked after would be much the same as those of the Greek Cypriots. But as legislation and other legal acts emanating from the European Union have to be applied and executed through organs of the member states, certain Cypriot agencies will have to be instituted which are superior to the agencies of the communal states. This will apply for example to monetary matters and to matters of foreign trade. Designs to guarantee effective exclusion of discriminations in this connection require the philosopher's stone. The difficulty is enhanced by the fact that the Greek Cypriots were able to bypass the designs developed for this purpose as early as in 1960, while Europe did not object but subsequently sided with the Greek conflicting party.

Unification of two Cypriot states also prerequires agreement on a final regulation concerning the ownership of real estate property lost by Turkish or Greek owners in the course of the exchange of territory and population since 1964. Should Greek Cypriots be allowed to use their former property in the north according to European Union law, new rivalry would be invited that could easily result in a confrontation resembling that of 1963 and the following years. (It means playing with fire, if this confrontation is described, as in Neue Zürcher Zeitung of 22.1.2002 - as a conflict of a small number of extremists or passionate nationalists of the two sides.) If a truhful compromise is not achieved, the conflict will flare up again even after an agreement, kindled by arguments as tested before contending this time that agreement was exorted from the parties by making it a condition for entrance into the European Union. Greek property in the Turkish part of Cyprus is hardly otherwise conceiveable without threatening peace than under the jurisdiction of a Turkish Cypriot communal state. Furthermore, regulations must be agreed to solve incongruencies between contradictory legislation and other legal acts that emanated from the communal administrations between 1963 and unification. In areas not covered by  the European Union, like general matters of foreign policy or matters of citizenship, central adminsitrative agencies or at least central decisions will also be necessary. Last not least an agreement on a balance of military power is indispensable.

No matter to what degree Greek claims will succeed in pending negotitations, an agreement will endure only if it is supported by the public opinion in the Greek conflicting party. So far nothing indicates such support for the minimal requirements of an agreement. But what sense would it make to lock together two communities, the more powerful of wchich continues to look at the other as a conquest hungry enemy of all culture, as an enemy of their vital needs and of their political claims, and if that more powerful community has concentrated its efforts on harming the other community which it now desires as a partner, continuously disparaging it and accusing it of a policy of which it is guilty itself ? Neither would it help to forget why and by which means the Greek conflicting party has destroyed the compromise of 1959/60. Finally the patience must not be forgotten, with which the Turkish conflicting party, having truthfully observed that compromise, has endured the punishment of isolation of North Cyprus for that destruction. Otherwise all teachings would be lost that should be derived from the Cyprus conflict.

* * *

Some accents in media publications are counterproductive.

Little of all this is mentioned in the media. One finds in them instead arguments of little use, which are dealt with in the following part of this article.

The words by the foreign minister of South Cyprus, Kassoulides, to the effect that there was no room for "legalizing a partition" of the island (Handelsblatt 7.12.2001; Neue Zürcher Zeitung 16.2.2002; vide also the opinion of Süddeutsche Zeitung of 18.1.2002, according to which Denktas must now say "whether he has really given up the old idea of partition"), reflect an opinion prevailing in the south. A solution, for this opinion, is tantamount with a return of Greeks to the north and Greek majority rule in the island. The opinion is nourished by the wishful thought that the Turkish side has "gone through a basic change of its Cyprus policy" (NZZ 22.1.2002). Such an evaluatin must be warned against. Without territorial allocation of Turkish Cypriot self government permanent peace is unlikely to come about. If an agreement which does not comply with the Greek ideal of dominating Cyprus is not to be defamed ( as in 1960 and the years to follow) as forced upon Greeks and therefore invalid, considerable efforts must be made to change this general opinion, which (as shown by the words of Mr. Kassoulides) have not even started yet. It does not help much that it is possible to interpret "legalization of partition" in the sense of many different legal constructions.

Many opinions insist on a dependency from the good will of the European Union, for which Turkey must pay the price of accepting the Greek claims as supported by the European Union in compliance with the United Nations (Handelsblatt 4.12.2001 and probably Süddeutsche Zeitung 18.1.2002). This view must be rejected. A unification of Europe with Turkey would be poorly based if the interest in accession was not equally valued by Europe and by Turkey. The acceptance of a country into the EU must not degenerate to an act of mercy. It is true that the impression is being created as if Greek domination over Cyprus were part of the "acquis communautaire". This would, in view of a correct evaluation of the conflict, constitute however a fatal acquis.

Reference to the right of veto against an eastern expansion of the European Union, of which Greece could make use if her claims concerning Cyprus are not met, would express a rather low opinion of the political potential of this Union. By using her right in this way, Greece would place unjustified demands, in which no other country has any interest of its own, above important interests of Europe and of the acceding countries. Moreover, these demands are incompatible with justified interests of Turkey and can only be realized in violation of the right of the Turkish Cypriots to self determination. One should analyse the motives of a country applying for membership in an organization unable or unwilling to cope with such pressure.

Little scruple is indicated by remarking that only admittance into the European Union can help the Turkish Cypriots in their economic misery (Neue Zürcher Zeitung 17.1.2002, where one finds a misleading hint to "grinding poverty"), and in particular in view of the responsibility of Europe for an isolation of Turkish Cyprus, wich is one of the causes for its unfavourable economic condition. Asking a people to sell its right to self determination (which it had been obliged to defend with high sacrifices against violent usurpation) for economic advantages, degrades an inalienable right to a mere trading object (Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 16.1.2002). Worse than that, because misleading, are remarks that the Turks of Cyprus, who were not responsible for partition but who had to leave their homes in fear and terror with many pains, have "now too" developed the wish for renunifcation and accession of Cyprus into the European Union. NZZ 16.1.2002 points to the fact that 90% of them support accession without examining or naming the conditions under which such a wish exists (the article "Hoffnung und Skepsis" in Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung of 23rd January 2002 suffers from the same misunderstanding). It is a mistake to believe that peace around Cyprus can be achieved by enforcing renunciation to the right to self determination as the price for lifting economic isolation, even if pressure applied to that effect should be successful. Certainly Denktas, contrary to opposite assumptions (Handelsblatt 16.1.2002), is not a victim of such a mistake.

A contention to the effect that the Turkish interventin of 1974 had caused the feeling in Greek diplomacy that it had become a hostage of  Turkey, that the intervention had provided Turkey with the power "of deciding in fact alone the fate of Cyprus", and that it caused the danger for Turkey of becoming an occupier of EU-teritory (NZZ 22.1.2002) distorts reality: This version is refuted by a comparison between the Greek usurpers of 1963 et seq. having been warmly accepted into the arms of the West and by the enormous economic boom of south Cyprus on the one hand with the isolation and embargo situation suffered by north Cyprus and accompanied by the diffamation of the Turkish Cyprus policy on theother. And the danger connected with an acceptance of Cyprus into the European Union without Turkish assent lies totally on the side of Europe: If the Charta of the European Community were to be strictly interpreted it would oblige Euope to go to war with Turkey.

Should it be true that applause for the current talks is larger in the North than in the South of Cyprus (Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung of 23.1.2002 "Hoffnung und Skepsis"), then this is due to a demand for Greek predominance still prevailing in the South, where it is, however, correctly realized at the same time that to prevent such predominance is an objective of the Turkish party to these talks. Misleading and therefore unconstructive is the wishful thought expressed in this connection that the Turks of Cyprus regarded European minority policy, which has turned against them since 1964, as their best protection or that they had come to realize that partition "was" not in their interest (similar ideas are expressed in NZZ 22.1.2002). It is defficult to understand why the Greek side, according to this article (and to a statement in NZZ of 22.1.2002) does not know what the Turks of Cyprus really think or want, and that the Greek side, in the face of experiences made "with Denktasch", should have doubts concerning the political will of the Turkish side. Seldom in history has a political demand been upheld without change for so many decades as the Turkish-Cypriot demand for self government, and Denktash is therefore one of the few politicians who, for the same length of time, was not obliged to change his political goals and evaluations. This will of the Turkish conflicting party consists in utmost clarity in the demand for self government, and it would be a fateful error to dismiss this demand as a hobby of Denktasch (as some have tried to describe Greek demand for dominance as a hobby of Makarios or - as NZZ 22.1.2002 - of the Greek Colonel's regime of 1974). It seems to be this Turkish will which is the object of the "fear" quoted in NZZ 22.1.2002 as prevailing in the Greek part of the island of Cyprus.

Again and again "flexibility" is being called for - and mainly that of the Turkish conflicting party (NZZ 17.1.2002). As far as the alternative of one and/or several states of Cyprus is concerned, this call for flexibility is highly misleading (vide Neue Zürcher Zeitung 16.1.2002 where "two diametrically opposed concepts" are mentioned). And as far as other conditions of agreement are concerned, such call promotes the error of easiness which would soon be recognized by its authors if they were to occupy themselves with such conditions (for example at the hand of the constitution of 1960). Without such occupation, that call appears rather too inexpensive.

Many contributions in the media contain a tendency of attaching to the Turkish conflicting party a special obligation towards accepting Greek demands. Thus to ignore the circumstances of the conflict is not only unjust but primarily detrimental to efforts for peace and a solution, and it is a way to make both conflicting parties all the more determined to pursue maximal demands.

A journalist asked me the other day: What would Germans say, if the Turks who live in Germany asked that part of Germany be ceded to them ? The question relies on the assumption that Cyprus belonged to the Greeks. It uses the general meaning of the notion of a "minority" and ignores that the Greek conflicting party, after the British sovereignty had been withdrawn, has attempted to enforce its century-old demand for predominance in Cyprus, which is maintained until this day, against the determined wish of the Turks of Cyprus to govern themselves, by - sometimes bloody - force. Since a Greek state of Cyprus never existed, this attempt cannot be based on a right to suppress the revolution of a minority. The question therefore discloses the core of the Cyprus conflict and at the same time the responsibility for it. If similarities between German and Cypriot conditions were to be highlighted, it should rather be asked what Europe would say if Germany demanded restoration of its eastern territories lost after 1945.

The attorney General of the Greek republic of South Cyprus, Makrides,  has referred vis-à-vis Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung to the basic European rights of free movement, particularly in the form of the right of free settlement and of freedom of capital movement and to human righs, with which mass exchange of property is not compatible (FAZ 23rd Jan. 2002). It is true that Turkish Cypriot governance of part of the Cyprus territory does not necessarily require total renunciation to the rights and liberties mentioned. But it must not be overlooked that Turkish Cpriots are also entitled to such rights and that, owing to their social and economic situation, for which the Greeks bear part of the responsibility, a danger exists that even a merely economic predominance of Greeks in a Turkish Cypriot territory develop into a threat for peace. Such a danger should therefore be contained by means of special provisions and, first of all, by an honest and credible renunciation to Greek predominance. Moreover, an exchange of property mediated by the respective governments would be - to say the least - very helpful.

* * *

The ideal solution and the alternatives: inter alia Turkish-American approachment.

Peace would best be served by admitting the Turkish Republic of North Cyprus on equal terms to international intercourse. Self determination for the Turkish Cypriots corresponds with the much invoked "European values". And Europe has a substantial while often underestimated interest in Turkey and in the satisfaction of her vital interests. Self determination for the Turkish Cypriots is compatible with the formation of a Cypriot State composed of two communal states, if secure protection of the Turkish Cypriots against discrimination is guaranteed. Self determination for the Turkish Cypriots is also compatible with a provisional arrangement providing for accession of the Greek communal state of Cyprus to the European Union if  combined with some sort of an association with the Turkish communal state of Cyprus with the European Union.