17 January  2003

 SYMPOSIUM ON CYPRUS

ANKARA, TURKISH NATIONAL ASSEMBLY BUILDINGS,
SENATE HALL

Cyprus: the Beginning of the End?

Clement Dodd

My approach to the Cyprus conflict is guided by the need to be strictly academic, to be involved in analysis not prescription, to strive after a perhaps impossible impartiality. I hope you will have some sympathy with my predicament. Sitting on a narrow fence for a long time is decidedly painful.

The major issue at stake in Cyprus is the not uncommon one of whether a minority community conscious of its religious, linguistic and cultural identity, and anxious not to be dominated by others, should be allowed to be independent. The right of self-determination is usually invoked to say that they possess that right. There is a good deal of feeling, however, that breaking up the world into tiny states is likely to produce an uncontrollable world entity.

Certainly some important considerations have to be borne in mind in deciding about such cases, including that of the Turkish Cypriot minority community. It is often argued that an ethnic or similar minority should be allowed to rule itself if (1) the desire to be independent is freely and democratically expressed, not created by terrorist activism and (2) that it does not inflict disproportionate damage on the larger community. This could occur if the majority was denied access, say, to shared vital energy sources, or if it was exposed to attack by the minority community’s allies. A third requirement would be that the minority community was historically established in the country, not just composed of recent immigrants. It would also be practically difficult to allow independence if the two communities were not physically separate - a consideration that made the Turkish proposal in the 1950s for division (taksim) difficult to envisage.

Usually, it is better if minority communities do not secede to form their own states, but it is not easy to achieve this end. To bring it about calls for deliberate self-sacrifice on the part of the major community. This would often entail, for instance, the granting of some degree of local autonomy, but at the same time encouraging, and providing real opportunities for, minority group members to become part of joint economic, social, and political elites and to develop loyalties to joint communal institutions. This is not an easy route to harmony; it calls for considerable political skill and forbearance. Unhappily these qualities have not been much evident in the Greek Cypriot majority community in Cyprus. They have believed that to agree to autonomy for the Turkish Cypriots would expose them to Turkish aggression, but, more important, there has been the strong belief that no part of Cyprus can be surrendered: it is in toto a vital part of the Hellenic world.

When in 1963 the Greek Cypriots tried, without success, to persuade the Guarantor Powers of the 1960 Treaties to change the Constitution in their favour, they then resorted to violence and intimidation to achieve their ends. When, a little later, in 1964, the UN Security Council sought authority to introduce a UN force into the island to maintain law and order, it balefully recognised the rump Greek Cypriot government in power as the Government of Cyprus, to the joy of the Greek and the despair of the Turkish Cypriots, who perforce had largely fled their offices out of fear. They now refused to have minority status forced upon them, refusing to accept changes to the Constitution made unilaterally by the Greek Cypriots. Thus the present Cyprus problem was born. As we all know, eventually the Turkish Government, as a Guarantor Power, intervened in 1974 under its legal rights to prevent both the complete subjugation of the Turkish Cypriots after the coup promoted by the Greek Junta and the threatened union with Greece (enosis) which was prohibited in the 1960 Treaties.

Subsequently, the UN Security Council tried, and is still trying, to bring about a solution, but has laboured under two handicaps. First, since the UN has always recognised the Greek Cypriot Government as the rightful government of all Cyprus; it has never been regarded as an impartial arbiter by the Turkish Cypriots. Secondly, during the course of the many negotiations over the years the Turkish Cypriots have always demanded in any joint government the level of political equality they were given under the 1960 Constitution, which had pronounced confederal features. By contrast, the Greek Cypriots, conscious of being in an almost five to one majority on the island in 1960 have always claimed the ‘democratic’ right as the majority to have the major say in the affairs of the island: they have never accepted that majority rule only applies in democracies when the majority can, in theory and practice, be converted into a majority, which is not the case in Cyprus. The acceptance by the UN of the Greek Cypriot Government as the legitimate government of the whole island led to the imposition of a crippling international embargo on the Turkish Cypriots, but for which they could readily have made a satisfactory living for themselves, mainly through international tourism. Instead they have had to ask Turkey for help, which has been generously given.

The Easy Solution

It can be argued that without the involvement of the UN, if the problem had simply been left to the two protagonists to solve after 1974, it might have been settled by now. Certainly in the early days after 1974, it would have been easier to hand back areas of territory to the Greek Cypriots than it is now, and the problem of abandoned property might well have been less acute. The elements of a solution would have been the withdrawal of Greek Cypriot claims to overall sovereignty in return for satisfaction over property and territory. However the simple solution was not to be. The UN, and now, more importantly, the European Union have been drawn into the conflict, mainly through the efforts of the Greek Cypriots, who have successfully internationalised the conflict to obtain their ends. The involvement of the EU has been extremely important because, unlike the UN, it has real and effective economic power. As we know, EU involvement followed blackmail by the Greek Government in 1995, when it threatened to veto the EU/Turkey Customs Union unless accession negotiations were started with the Republic of Cyprus.

The Present UN Plan

We now have a new UN Plan for the settlement of the dispute, amended on 10 December, and perhaps soon subject to further modification by its authors. Like all complex documents it needs to be studied coolly and carefully.  It certainly needs informed public discussion. To subject it to opinion polls at this stage, as has occurred in the TRNC, is anything but helpful. Although ostensibly democratic in the widest sense, opinion polls and referenda can easily reflect emotion, rather than knowledge and understanding. A referendum is promised in Britain on whether Britain should adopt the Euro as its currency, but very few people indeed understand the economic and political implications of such a decision. ‘Democracy’, it has been said ‘is not the multiplication of ignorant opinions’. Hence the need for parliaments with well-chosen and responsible members able and prepared to examine such issues in depth both inside parliament and in the media.

The UN Plan includes two, alternative, maps that reduce the size of the territory of the Turkish Cypriots to some 28 per cent of the whole from the nearly 37 per cent they now hold. In total this would not seem unreasonable. In the 1980s the Turkish Cypriots indicated that they could reduce their territory to some 29 per cent. The problem lies in where the land is to be surrendered. The proposal drastically to reduce the Turkish Cypriot share of the fertile Morphou/Güzelyurt area creates serious problems for the Turkish Cypriot economy and poses the question of how to relocate the 40,000 persons who would be displaced.

The proposed return of dispossessed Greek Cypriot owners to property that will be under the control of the Turkish Cypriot ‘component state’ also raises difficulties. Although there are some significant restrictions on the re-occupation of property and on residence, the proposed Plan does appear to allow up to 30 per cent, or even perhaps a third, of the population in the Turkish Cypriot ‘component state’ to be Greek Cypriot in the course of some 30 years, though, of course, it might never happen. The same could, in theory, occur in the Greek Cypriot ‘component state’. Thirty per cent or more of its population could be Turkish Cypriot, but with three times the population the Greek Cypriots would be in a similar situation to that of the Turkish Cypriots only if all the Turkish Cypriot population of some 180,000 went to live in the Greek Cypriot ‘component state’! The articles on residence are not without some ambiguities, and it is admittedly difficult to judge how the proposals on property and residence would work out over time. They clearly need to be examined thoroughly before any decisions are made.  One factor to be considered is the proposal that other ‘component state’s’ residents would qualify for citizenship, and therefore for voting rights, after seven years’ residence. This could be important for the election of members of the parliament of the joint or ‘common state’, which must now be considered

The ‘Common State’

Alongside two component states the UN Plan establishes a ‘common state’. The two ‘component states’ are, significantly, not described as ‘constituent’ states, thus avoiding any assumption that the common state has been established by the two component states and owes its sovereignty to them. This is not likely to be a formulation welcomed by the Turkish Cypriot Government, which has always insisted on the recognition of its own sovereignty. Yet residual powers rest with the two states, as in most federations. The common state cannot add functions at its discretion and there is not a hierarchical relationship between the common state and the component states. However, the common state can take over functions of the component states if approved by separate referenda in the component states: the governments of the component states would only have to be consulted, so they would be bypassed to some extent.

It is interesting, and significant, that the constitutional elements in the UN Plan were foreshadowed in the verbal note presented to both sides in November 2000 in the course of the proximity negotiations then in train. It contained a sketchier version of the present Plan, but like the present Plan it gave the leading role in the common state to the Greek Cypriots. It incorporated the views of the Greek Cypriot side as they had emerged in the 1992 negotiations on the UN Secretary-General’s ‘Set of Ideas’. The presentation of the UN’s proposals in November 2000 was one reason for the breakdown of the proximity negotiations.

Constitutional structure: The major problem for the Turkish Cypriots in the Constitution proposed is that the Greek Cypriots would be in the ascendancy in the common state’s institutions. The membership of the lower house of the legislature, the Chamber of Deputies, would be proportionate to the numbers of citizens in each state. Of the 48 seats each community would, however, have at least 12 seats. In the upper house, the Senate, the two communities would share equally the 48 seats. All deputies and senators would be directly elected by the electorate of each state. None would be elected, or appointed, by the component state parliaments. They are bypassed.

Voting would be by simple majority in both chambers, though votes in the Senate would normally require that they included a quarter of each side’s senators present and voting. In legislation dealing with finance, immigration, foreign affairs and election of the executive Presidential Council, the proportion is raised to two fifths. This would constitute some check on the Greek Cypriot majority, but that is all. It is not a veto power for the Turkish Cypriots by any means, and does not, therefore, provide political equality.

The six member Presidential Council is also proportional to the numbers of citizens of each state, though two councillors have to be from each community. The Turkish Cypriots would be in a minority. All the members are appointed by the legislature, in which the Greek Cypriot influence, as has been seen, is predominant. It is, therefore, likely to be additionally worrying for the Turkish Cypriot side that under a 10 December revision in the draft Plan, the Presidential Council appoints ‘members for EU and international bodies’, including inter alia, the European Commission, and the European Court of Human Rights (Strasbourg).

The Turkish Cypriot Approach

The constitution now proposed by the UN is very different from that advanced by the Turkish Cypriot Government. They envisage a new ‘Partnership State of Cyprus’, in which the legislature, or ‘Joint Parliamentary Council’, would be composed of 18 members, 9 from each of the Assemblies of each partner state. The functions of this legislature are not greatly different from those outlined in the UN Plan, extending over quite a wide range, but legislation and decisions would require to be supported by a majority of members from each side’s representatives.

The executive would be a Presidential Partnership Council, to be composed of each state’s president and five members from each partner state designated by each state’s president. The Partnership State would have a joint international personality. A great deal of co-operation and co-ordination between the two sides is envisaged. The spirit of equal partnership is stressed. The emphasis is on the co-operation of representatives appointed by the two states, with no provision for the participation of electorates in the formation of the confederal institutions. It is a state partnership.

It is interesting to recall the ‘Set of Ideas’ proposals advanced by the UN Secretary-General in 1992. These proposals fell some way between those of both sides. They repeated the basic constitutional position as it was under the 1960 Constitution, and virtually repeated in the ‘Draft Framework Agreement’ of 1986. The Turkish Cypriots accepted almost in toto, both the UN’s 1986 and 1992 constitutional proposals, but they were rejected by the Greek Cypriot side.

Under the ‘Set of Ideas’ the UN proposed a bi-cameral legislature. The mode of election was not mentioned, but it was implied that each side’s representatives would be elected by each community’s voters, as in the present UN Plan. The proportion of Greek to Turkish Cypriot representatives in the lower house would be 70:30. In the upper house there would be a 50:50 division. Again this is not too dissimilar from the present Plan

Voting would be by majority in each house, but - a most important difference - in the lower house a majority of each community’s representatives could decide that in a wide range of important issues the adoption of legislation would require separate majorities of each side’s deputies. The areas of legislation and decision concerned were important - foreign affairs, defence, security, budget, taxation, immigration and citizenship.

The ‘Set of Ideas’ proposals for membership of the executive Federal Council of Ministers required a Greek/Turkish Cypriot ratio of 7:3. The members would be appointed by the President and the Vice-President from their respective communities, not elected by parliament as in the UN Plan. Decisions would be by majority vote, as in the present Plan, but any decisions in the areas mentioned above would require the concurrence of both the Greek Cypriot President and the Turkish Cypriot Vice-President. Moreover, and following a feature of the 1960 Constitution, and the Draft Framework Agreement of 1986, the President and/or Vice-President could also veto any decision or law of the legislature in the areas mentioned above.

The 1992 UN proposals underlined that unanimity was necessary in essential matters, but did not seek to make the Turkish Cypriots numerically equal in the central institutions of the joint state. Quite remarkable was the power of the President and/or Vice-President to veto acts of the legislature in important areas, this underlining the essentially presidential type of state envisaged. The present UN Plan outlines a parliamentary form of state, with the Presidential Council appointed by parliament.

A danger faced in the 1992 proposals was that of impasse of the sort that, in the Greek Cypriot view, made the 1960 government ‘unworkable’. To provide against this danger the 1992 proposals contained ways of circumventing it. However, if the 1992 proposals were to come to the fore again, there would probably now be even less likelihood of impasse than in 1992. This is because with membership of the European Union, a great deal of legislation would emanate from Brussels. There would be less to fall out about. Also the 1992 proposals paid some respect to the disparity in size of the two communities, but without putting the Greek Cypriot majority in charge. At the same time the two sides would be brought together with perhaps more sense of belonging to one country through shared institutions than openly confederal arrangements would be inclined to achieve. If the 1992 proposals were revived, the Turkish Cypriots would, no doubt, want greater equality in the Council of Ministers (now called Presidential Council) and would require that common state legislation in important issues would entail a majority vote by each side’s deputies and senators.

It is very doubtful that the Greek Cypriots would accept, or even be prepared to discuss, the 1992 proposals, or some new form of them. If the Turkish Cypriots were to show some inclination to revive them, they would, at least, be able to claim that they were reverting to proposals not of their own manufacture, but made by the UN Secretary-General and approved by the Security Council. The UN has not apparently yet been asked why they have abandoned the ideas in the Set of Ideas in favour of the quite different, and less equitable, ones in the present UN Plan. It has perhaps been concluded that a compromise of the two sides’ opposing principles is impossible. Consequently, perhaps it has been decided to support the Greek Cypriot side’s views, in the belief that, as a member of the EU, the common state will have few important functions. That such would be the case is by no means clear, however.

The Importance of the Cyprus Issue

There are clearly many matters to be discussed in the new UN Plan and the discussions will take time. It is unfortunate that there is so little time left and that there is pressure to come to an agreement. The recent actions of some political party and other groups in Northern Cyprus in organising demonstrations in favour of the Plan must surely be deplored since they must only encourage the Greek Cypriots not to be conciliatory. The demonstrations seem to have been influenced by those in the press and elsewhere who have sought to show the Turkish Cypriot Government, and particularly President Denktash, as intransigent and denying the opportunity for the Turkish Cypriots to prosper as members of the European Union. Many commentators in Turkey have also urged that the non-solution of the Cyprus conflict will seriously prejudice Turkey’s chances of ever entering the European Union.

This is a matter that has, of course, to be taken seriously, but in the first place it has to be noted that in Copenhagen in December (2002) the European Council refreshingly did not mention Cyprus in its decision to postpone for two years consideration of Turkey’s case. It stressed, instead, the need for Turkey to satisfy the Copenhagen criteria. There is some danger that the Cyprus issue might come to be made something of a scapegoat for the rejection of accession negotiations for Turkey last December. In fact, it is arguable that too much emphasis is placed on the Cyprus issue in the context of Turkey’s future relations with the European Union. To some extent Turkey (and the Turkish Cypriot Government) have invited criticism through stressing the strength of the connection between Turkey and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. This has even included the suggestion that in the end the TRNC might well be annexed by Turkey. This stance invites the international community to assume that Turkey is responsible for the Cyprus dispute and for the TRNC. Of course, Turkey has to help the TRNC economically and militarily, but the Cyprus dispute was not caused by, or aggravated by, Turkey. Nor is the TRNC an extension of the Turkish state. The fact that Turkish troops are present in Northern Cyprus, does not mean, despite the assumptions of the European Court of Human Rights, that Turkey actually rules Northern Cyprus and is responsible for it. The TRNC is an independent state, and by reference to the criteria given at the beginning of this paper, is entitled to be accepted as such.

Moreover, in the longer term, it is probably unrealistic to assume that if there is no settlement agreeable to the Greek Cypriots, both Greek Cyprus and Greece will forever veto Turkey’s membership of the European Union. The accession of so large, populous, dynamic, and strategically important a country as Turkey would be an event of historic proportions. It is surely going to depend on Turkey’s economic and strategic importance and the extent to which Turkey’s political and cultural norms are seen to converge with those of the European Union - not on the Cyprus issue, or on what the tiny Greek Cypriot state might desire or even demand.

It will be much better if there is a settlement, but it must be one that will not set the two communities at loggerheads again and create a situation on the island much worse than at present. Unfortunately it is difficult to reconcile diametrically opposed principles. As the much larger and more powerful community, the Greek Cypriots could afford to agree to a large measure of equality for the Turkish Cypriots in the common state institutions. Such magnanimity looks decidedly unlikely, however. In its absence, to force the Turkish Cypriot side into a subordinate position could well have negative consequences in the long term, even though some Turkish Cypriots appear confident that in the EU environment they will be adequately protected.

Professor Clement Dodd
School of Oriental and African Studies
University of London