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Recent
Developments in the Cyprus Issue-A Realistic Appraisal
Mr.
Tahsin Ertuðruloðlu, Minister of Foreign Affairs and
Defence of the Turkish
Republic of Northern Cyprus
Introduction:
In
November 2001 President Denktaþ, having come to the
conclusion that things were progressing on a collision
course with the Greek Cypriot side, took an initiative,
inviting Mr. Clerides to face-to-face talks. Greek
Cypriot insistence on pursuing the road to unilateral EU
membership before a settlement; the EU’s insistence on
accommodating this unlawful action; and our
determination, together with Turkey, to stand firmly in
the way of such illegality were factors contributing to
President Denktaþ’s decision to do so. As a result of
this initiative, direct talks were held between the two
sides from 16 January 2002 until The Hague meeting on
10-11 March 2003.
From the onset of the talks, the
Turkish Cypriot side put forward constructive proposals
and made significant openings, with a view to reaching a
viable, lasting and mutually acceptable settlement with
the Greek Cypriot side. In particular, with its
comprehensive proposals of 29 April 2002, which were revised on 11 September 2002, the
Turkish Cypriot side put forward ideas and suggestions
covering a whole range of core issues including the
settlement of the property issue, political-economic
harmonisation and the institutional framework of the
proposed new
partnership mechanism.
In
spite of the above constructive approach by the Turkish
Cypriot side, the new process of direct talks did not
yield any positive or tangible result. It became clear
at the talks that the Greek Cypriot side had not come to
terms with the idea of sharing the future of the island
with the Turkish Cypriots, as their equals, under a new
partnership and that they remained at the negotiating
table for “tactical reasons” in order to safeguard
the smooth entry of the Greek Cypriot administration
into the EU.
Un
Secretary-General’s Proposals
The
Annan Plan presented on 11 November 2002, its first
revision of 10 December 2002 and second revision of 26
February 2003, all fell short of addressing our
legitimate demands and concerns on vital issues such as
sovereign equality of the two sides, the continuation of
the 1960 system of guarantees without any alterations,
the issue of bi-zonality and the settlement of property
issues through global exchange and compensation.
Recent
statements by the Greek Cypriot leaders have also
confirmed fears that the foundation agreement to be
signed by the “two leaders” on behalf of their
respective “sides” would not, in reality, create a
new partnership, but would merely allow the “Republic
of Cyprus” to reorganize itself as the “federal
State of Cyprus”. The Turkish Cypriot side, on the
other hand, has always supported the establishment of a
new partnership on the basis of two equal co-founder
States agreeing, as two sovereign equals, to set up a
new partnership and a new state of affairs in Cyprus. It
is crucial that the two partner states have identical
powers and functions as well as internationally
acknowledged existence and identity in order to make
their rights unassailable and permanent.
Unilateral
EU Membership of South Cyprus
Since
its unilateral application for EU membership in 1990,
the objective of the Greek Cypriot administration,
acting in its purported capacity as the “Government of
the Republic of Cyprus”, has been to “Europeanise”
the Cyprus issue by getting the EU involved in the
matter, both politically and economically. Despite our
legitimate opposition to the EU membership of
“Cyprus”, on the basis of the unilateral and
unlawful application made by the Greek Cypriot
administration, purporting to act for and on behalf of
the whole of Cyprus, the EU summit, held in Copenhagen
on 12-13 December 2002, approved the unilateral
membership of the Greek Cypriot administration of
Southern Cyprus, in total disregard of the historical,
legal and political realities on the island. EU’s
decision in Copenhagen
interfered with the UN Secretary-General’s
efforts as well as giving the wrong signals to the Greek
Cypriot side. Needless to say, this was totally
counterproductive as it was tantamount to pre-empting
the substance of any agreement and prejudicing the
ability of the two parties to engage in free
negotiations.
The
Turkish Cypriot side has always been in favour of
negotiations and, thus, has reaffirmed that it is ready
to continue the process of direct talks and that it
would spend every effort towards reaching a just and
realistic settlement in Cyprus. In this respect, despite
all the negative repercussions of the EU Copenhagen
Summit, the Turkish Cypriot side accepted the formation
of the two technical committees to focus, respectively,
on international treaties and laws of the envisaged
Partnership State. This was agreed upon at the meeting
of the two leaders with the United Nations Secretary-General
in New York on 3 - 4 October 2002. The Turkish Cypriot
side continued to negotiate in good faith hoping that
the Greek Cypriot side would show the necessary
political will and flexibility to reach a realistic
settlement.
However,
the Greek Cypriot administration, which has been
unfairly rewarded with EU membership on behalf of
“Cyprus” as a whole, lacked the political will and
determination for the establishment of a new partnership
and remained at the negotiating table for the sole
purpose of not upsetting its unilateral entry into the
European Union.
New
Leadership on the Greek Cypriot Side
The
results of the “presidential elections” that were
held on the Greek Cypriot side on 16 February, 2003 were
revealing in this regard. The Greek Cypriot people
changed their two-term veteran leader, Mr. Glafcos
Clerides, and elected Mr. Tassos Papadopoulos, because
they felt that Mr. Clerides had “given away too much”
at the talks. The reality, however, is that Mr. Clerides
had not shown any flexibility throughout the talks on
fundamental issues, insisting on “the continuity of
the Republic of Cyprus”. He remained at the
negotiating table for tactical reasons in order not to
jeopardize the EU membership prospects for the Greek
Cypriot side.
The
well-known track record of Mr. Papadopoulos, as an
active member of the Greek Cypriot terrorist
organization known as EOKA, also left no room for
optimism in respect of finding an early settlement in
Cyprus. Mr. Papadopoulos campaigned on a rejectionist
platform, openly attacking the Annan Plan and demanding,
among other things, that all Greek Cypriot displaced
people, who have long been resettled and rehabilitated
in the South through the use of Turkish Cypriot homes
and properties of comparable value, must return to their
former properties in the Turkish Republic of Northern
Cyprus. This, in spite of the exchange of populations
agreement reached in Vienna on 2nd August
1975, implemented through the United Nations
Peacekeeping Forces in Cyprus (UNFICYP), which paved the
way for a “bi-zonal” settlement of the Cyprus issue.
Obviously, this kind of approach neither fosters
confidence between the two peoples nor promotes
reconciliation at the negotiating table. Mr.
Papadopoulos knew very well that the Turkish Cypriot
people would not concede to any plan which would
economically and politically jeopardize their very
existence in Cyprus, by opening the floodgates to Greek
Cypriot flooding of the North. Mr. Papadopoulos, who has
played an active role in the campaign to strip Turkish
Cypriots of their legitimate rights and status in the
1960s, should also know very well that the Turkish
Cypriots would not succumb to pressures and intimidation.
Prospects
for a Settlement
As
for the Annan plan, it is a well known fact that all of
the political parties which make up the Greek Cypriot
National Council had serious objections to the proposals
of the Secretary-General. In an editorial entitled
“What incentive is there for talks?” the Greek
Cypriot daily Sunday
Mail of 15 December 2002 wrote the following:
“The
truth is that the majority of Greek Cypriots were
opposed to the Annan plan anyway, and the only reason it
was not rejected was for fear that doing so might
jeopardize (the Greek Cypriot administration’s) EU
accession. With an invitation for accession in the bag,
neither Clerides nor his successor has much incentive to
resume negotiations on the much-hated peace plan.”
The
Greek Cypriot daily Phileleftheros
of 10 January 2003 revealed that, acting in conformity
with the Greek Cypriot National Council’s decision
that the UN plan was not acceptable but could only be
negotiated, the Speaker of the Greek Cypriot House of
Representatives, Mr. Christofias, had advised Mr.
Clerides not to sign the Foundation Agreement while he
was in Copenhagen.
Public
opinion polls carried out among the Greek Cypriot
population in the wake of the publication of the Annan
plan amply demonstrate the abovementioned negative
stance of the Greek Cypriot side towards the plan. For
instance, an opinion poll carried out by the Greek
Cypriot daily Politis
and US establishment Nilsen/Amer between
14 – 15 November 2002 revealed that only 28% of
those who were polled supported the UN package. A
similar result
was obtained by the Greek establishment ALCO in a survey
held between 15 – 18 November 2002 in South Cyprus and
Greece. According to this opinion poll, 71% of those
surveyed in South Cyprus and 53.8% in Greece rejected
the Annan Plan (Greek Cypriot dailies Mahi,
Alithia and
Simerini dated 22 November 2002).
A
follow-up opinion poll conducted by the Greek Cypriot
daily Politis
in collaboration with the US firm Neilsen/Amer revealed
that only 27% of the Greek Cypriots polled approved the
Annan plan (Politis of 24 November 2002). Furthermore, opinion poll results
published in the Greek Cypriot daily Simerini
on 11 December 2002 indicated a dwindling support among
the Greek Cypriots to the Annan proposals. According to
this poll, while 86% of respondents said “no”, only
10% said “yes” and 4% remained undecided.
Opinion
polls on the Turkish Cypriot side reflected a similar
trend, with approximately 62% of Turkish Cypriots saying
“no” to the Annan plan, according to a pole
conducted by Sabancý
University For The Turkish-Greek Forum, on 15
February, 2003. Just as significantly, according to an
opinion poll conducted by the Sonar Consultancy and
Research Services in January 2003, 81% Turkish Cypriots
rejected the idea of living mixed with the Greek
Cypriots as was the case before 1974, exposing one of
the major weaknesses of the Kofi Annan proposals.
The
Hague Meeting
These
public trends on both sides of the Green Line were
reflected in the official positions of the two parties,
with both sides demanding amendments to the Annan
proposal, revised for the second time on 26 February
2003. Thus, when the two leaders met with the UNSG at
The Hague on 10-11 March 2003, their responses to
Secretary-General Kofi Annan’s proposal for a
comprehensive settlement and the holding of separate
simultaneous referanda on the plan were not
fundamentally different. Although the Greek Cypriot side
may claim otherwise, its, tactical approach could not
disguise the fact that its response amounts to a
rejection of UNSG’s plan and the holding of referenda.
Conclusion
It
should be reiterated that by inviting the Greek Cypriot
administration of Southern Cyprus to join the European
Union without a settlement at Copenhagen, in total
disregard of the historical, legal and political
realities on the Island, the European Union has pre-empted
the Secretary-General’s efforts. The Greek Cypriot
side, which has been unfairly rewarded with EU
membership on behalf of Cyprus as a whole, is now even
less likely to come to terms with the Turkish Cypriots
on the basis of a realistic, viable settlement.
In
the event that the EU finalizes the admission of the
Greek Cypriot administration as a new member before a
settlement is reached between the two sides, there will
be no prospects for a negotiated settlement. The
division of Cyprus will become permanent; and the EU
will have imported in its ranks a problematic member
with all the implications of sustained instability and
friction in the Eastern Mediterranean.
In
such an event, the international community, in general,
and the Greek Cypriot side, in particular, should be
fully aware that the Turkish Cypriot side will not be
without options. If the Greek Cypriot side is not
prepared to enter into a meaningful association with the
Turkish Cypriot side under an acceptable framework which
would protect the basic rights, interests and status of
the Turkish Cypriots, then needless to say the Turkish
Republic of Northern Cyprus, as an independent and
sovereign country, will chart its own course with a view
to securing the well-being of the Turkish Cypriot people,
and together with its Guarantor, Turkey, will take all
necessary steps to ensure that Turkish Cypriots assume
their rightful place among the community of nations. |
